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 NEW HARDWARE ALGORITHMS AND DESIGNS 
FOR MONTGOMERY MODULAR INVERSE COMPUTATION  
IN GALOIS FIELDS GF(p) AND GF(2n) 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Information security nowadays is a very important subject [32,40,41].  Governments, 
commercial businesses, and individuals are all demanding secure information in electronic 
documents, which is becoming preferred over traditional documents (paper and microfilm, 
for example). Documents in electronic form require less storage space, its transfer is almost 
instantaneous, and it is accessible via simplified databases. The ability to make use of 
information more efficiently has resulted in a rapid increase in the value of information. 
Businesses in a number of commercial arenas recognize information as their most valuable 
asset [34]. 
However, information in electronic form faces potentially more damaging security 
threats. Unlike information printed on paper, information in electronic form can virtually 
be stolen from a remote location. It is much easier to alter and intercept electronic 
communication than its paper-based predecessors. 
Information security is described as the set of measures taken to prevent unauthorized 
use of electronic data, whether this unauthorized use takes the form of disclosure, 
alteration, substitution, or destruction of the data. The requirements to securely maintain 
electronic information are classified as the following three services:  
• Confidentiality - hiding data from unauthorized parties.  
• Integrity - assurance that data is genuine. 
• Availability - the system still functions efficiently after security provisions are in place. 
 
Several measures have been considered to provide these services but no single measure 
can ensure complete security [32]. Of the various proposed measures, the use of 
cryptographic systems offers the highest level of security, together with maximum 
flexibility [40,41]. A cryptographic system transforms electronic data into a modified form. 
The owner of the information in modified form is now assured of its security features. 
Depending on the security services required, the assurance may be that the data cannot be 
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altered without detection, or it may be that the data is unintelligible to all but authorized 
parties. 
In the past, cryptographic systems have provided only confidentiality. Preparing a 
message for a secure, private transference involves the process of encryption. Encryption 
transforms data from user readable form, called plaintext, to an illegible translation, called 
ciphertext. The conversion of plaintext to ciphertext is controlled by an electronic key E. 
The key is simply a binary number, which determines the effect of the encryption function. 
The reverse process of retrieving the plaintext back from the ciphertext is called 
decryption, and is controlled by a related key D. 
Depending on the encryption/decryption key, cryptographic systems can be classified 
into two main categories: secret key cryptosystems and public key cryptosystems. The 
secret key cryptosystems use one key (E=D) for both encryption and decryption, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.1. Since the keys are the same, two users wishing to communicate in 
confidence must agree and maintain a common secret key. Each entity must trust the other 
to keep the key as a secret. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Secret key cryptosystem 
 
 
Public key cryptosystems, however, use two different keys, one for encryption (E) and 
the other for decryption (D), where D≠E. Public key cryptosystems were introduced in 
1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [5]. In a public-key cryptosystem, the 
abilities to perform encryption and decryption are separated. The encryption needs a public 
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key (E) different but mathematically related to the decryption private key (D). Knowledge 
of the public key allows encryption of plaintext but does not allow decryption of the 
ciphertext. If somebody selects and publishes his public key, then everyone can use that 
public key to encrypt messages for that person. The private key is kept secret so that only 
the intended individual can decrypt the ciphertext. Figure 1.2 shows a public key 
cryptosystem methodology. One of the most promising public key cryptographic methods 
to be used is named the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which provides the best 
performance security of any public key cryptosystem known today [32,40,41]. ECC is 
based on the Discrete Logarithm problem over the points on an elliptic curve. In order to 
use ECC, an elliptic curve must be defined over a specific finite field. A finite field is a set 
of elements that have a finite order (number of elements). The order of a Galois Field (GF) 
is normally a prime number or a power of a prime number.  The most popular finite fields 
used in ECC are Galois Fields, GF(p) and GF(2n) [9-12,28,29]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Public key cryptosystem 
 
 
ECC is heavily based on modular multiplication, which involves division by the 
modulus in its computations. Division, however, is a very expensive operation [13,14]. 
This characteristic of modular operations made researchers seek out methods to reduce the 
division impact and make modulo multiplication less time consuming. In 1985, P. 
Montgomery proposed an algorithm to perform modular multiplication without trial 
division [15]. The algorithm replaces the complex division with simple divisions by two, 
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which is effortlessly achieved in the binary representation of numbers (shifting the binary 
number one bit to the right). The penalty in using Montgomerys technique is paid with 
some extra computations to represent the multiplication operands into Montgomery 
domain and transform them back to integer domain [1,6,11,15]. The reader is referred to 
[15] for detailed information about Montgomerys method. A brief description of the 
Montgomery concept is provided in Chapter 3. 
The ECC computation consists of different modular arithmetic operations where 
inversion is an essential one, with the slowest speed [1,2,9-12,20-25]. Since the use of 
Montgomerys method requires that the numbers are in Montgomerys domain, it is clear 
that having procedures dedicated to compute the modular inverse in the Montgomery 
domain [1,2] would be extremely beneficial. These dedicated modular inverse methods are 
named the Montgomery modular inverse algorithms. 
Montgomery inverse (MonInv) computation can be performed in software or 
hardware for either GF(p) or GF(2n). In this thesis, one of our goals is to design an efficient 
scalable MonInv hardware to operate in both finite fields GF(p) and GF(2n). Scalability is 
the feature that allows the hardware to fit into restricted areas and operate with high clock 
frequency, which together are rarely possible for the fully parallel designs. 
We start by considering the inverse computation in GF(p). It is well known that 
algorithms dedicated for GF(p) computation may be adjusted for GF(2n). However, it is 
very difficult to modify a GF(2n) algorithm for GF(p) [11,35]. The standard modular 
inverse over GF(p) can be defined by the following example. Assume a is an integer in the 
range [1,p-1]. Integer x is called the modular inverse, or modulo inverse, of integer a if-
and-only-if: ax ≡ 1 (mod p); where x ∈[1,p-1]. It is normally represented as x = a-1 mod p 
[1]. The MonInv algorithm suitable for our research is portrayed in [1]. The algorithm 
requires two main operations: an almost Montgomery inverse (AlmMonInv) and a 
correction phase (Montgomery product) operation. Our study modifies this algorithm for 
hardware and introduces a new faster correction phase. A similar GF(2n) MonInv algorithm 
is also proposed, where both GF(p) and GF(2n) MonInv algorithms are designed as a 
unified MonInv hardware for GF(p) and GF(2n). 
The motivation to focus our research on the design of inversion in hardware is 
explained in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 presents a brief review of the previous attempts to 
perform inversion in hardware. Section 1.3 details the thesis outline. 
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1.1 Motivation 
 
  Modular inverse arithmetic is a fundamental arithmetic operation in public-key 
cryptography. It is used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange method [5], and to calculate 
private decryption key for RSA [4]. Modular inversion is considered an essential operation 
in the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [1,2,9-12,20-25]. This research is targeted mainly 
toward the ECC utilization because of its promise to replace several older cryptographic 
systems [9-12,20]. ECC arithmetic consists mainly in modular computations of addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, and inversion. 
Inversion is well known to be the slowest operation among all other arithmetic 
operations in ECC [1,2,11,16-18]. Many researchers propose minimizing the use of 
modular inversion by adopting elliptic curves defined for projective coordinates, which 
substitute the inverse by several multiplication operations [9-12]. Projective coordinates 
are one of two coordinate systems used for the ECC arithmetic point operations; the other 
one is known as affine [11] coordinate system (detailed in Chapter 2). Inversion, in the 
projective coordinate systems, is required only once, to convert the projective coordinate 
points to affine coordinates at the end of the ECC point computation. However, if this one 
use of inversion takes too long, it will affect the performance of the whole ECC system.  
To have a fast modular inverse calculation is one of the main reasons to do inversion 
in hardware instead of software [16-18]. If it is possible to compute the inverse faster than 
nine multiplication operations, then it is more efficient to use the affine coordinate system 
instead of going to the projective coordinate systems, as discussed in Chapter 2. Even if the 
speed to compute the inverse is not that good to justify the use of affine coordinates, the 
computation with hardware is still faster than software [6,16-18,20-25], which will provide 
better performance for the overall cryptographic system based on projective coordinates. 
The other main reason to implement the modular inverse operation in hardware is 
security [32]. For cryptographic applications, it is more secure to have all the computations 
handled in hardware, inside an IC-chip for example, instead of mixing some computations 
performed in software with others processed in hardware. Software implementations are 
supported by operating systems, which can be interrupted and trespassed by intruders and 
this way compromise the application security. Such a security threat is not so easily 
attained in hardware implementations [32]. 
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1.2 Previous Work 
 
Modular inversion is often performed based on modifying, or directly using, the 
extended Euclidean algorithm [11]. Several inversion hardware attempts are described in 
the literature [16-18,20-25,35]. Most of the research [17,18,20-25] proposed hardware 
models specifically designed for inversion in GF(2n). Among them, the large architectures 
in [23,24] suffer from the problem of signal broadcasting. The signal broadcasting problem 
should be avoided when implementing high-speed VLSI circuits [17,39]. 
In contrast, the designs in [17,18,21,22,25] are based on the concept of parallel 
systolic array structures. A systolic array [39] consists of a set of interconnected logic cells, 
each capable of performing the same simple operation. They work together and 
synchronously to perform a task. Within a systolic array or tree, information and data flow 
between the cells in a pipelined regular mode. Although systolic arrays are well suited for 
VLSI implementations due to its modular identical cells and simple and regular 
communications and control structures, it normally consumes a huge amount of hardware 
area in order to gain computation speed [17]. The area and time complexities of the designs 
in [17,18,21,22,25] are listed in Table 1.1.  
 
 
Hardware Design Area Complexity Time Complexity 
Guo & Wang [17] O(n2) O(1) 
Choudhury & Barua [18] O(n) O(n2) 
Guo & Wang [21] O(n2) O(1) 
Fenn, Benaissa & Tayler [22] O(n2) O(n) 
Kovac, Ranganathan & Varanasi [25] O(n. n2) O(1) 
 
Table 1.1 Area and time complexity of different inversion hardware designs  
 
 
Hasan in [20] proposed a hardware design for the GF(2n) inversion algorithm in a 
non-systolic structure consuming smaller hardware area and still operating with reasonable 
speed. The large operands are divided into words. The hardware performs the computation 
on a word-by-word serial manner, instead of computing all the words in parallel. GF(2n) 
arithmetic requires simpler modular operations than GF(p) [11] because the carry 
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propagation delays in addition or subtractions are completely eliminated. Since we focus 
first on GF(p) and then extend it to GF(2n), the designs proposed for GF(2n) in [17,18,21-
25] were not beneficial to this work. As said before, extending a design done for GF(2n) to 
GF(p) is not practical [11]. 
Naofumi Takagi in [16], proposed an inverse algorithm for hardware with a redundant 
binary representation. Redundant representation is used to reduce the carry propagation 
delay problem in additions. However, the redundant binary representation requires more 
area, because redundant digits require more bits to be coded and stored. Furthermore, 
redundant representation needs data transformation, which results in considerable extra 
cost. 
Goodman and Chandrakasan in [35] presented a general cryptographic processor that 
computes modular algorithms coded in microcode, which can be modified with minimal 
effort.  The processor can perform inversion in both GF(p) and GF(2n) finite fields. Its 
datapath is reconfigurable and parameterized for numbers ranging in size from 8 to 1024 
bits, controlled by a shut-down unit. This unit is responsible for disabling unused portions 
of the data path in order to minimize any unnecessary power consumption. The processor 
hardware is designed carefully to be energy efficient and faster than software-based 
implementations. The main disadvantage of this processor is its huge area, with a core 
containing 880,000 devices. 
 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
In the following chapter (Chapter 2), more detail is given to the ECC theory, which is 
the main scope of our research. The ECC arithmetic operations over the two finite fields 
GF(p) and GF(2n) are compared. Then, some ECC based cryptographic applications are 
presented to give a practical flavor to the ECC theory. 
A suitable GF(p) Montgomery inverse algorithm for hardware implementation was 
proposed in [1]. It requires two types of different routines, almost Montgomery inverse and 
Montgomery product. We present the design of the almost Montgomery inverse routine in 
Chapter 3. Two implementations are described there. The first one is a fixed precision 
(fully parallel) hardware, which has some inherent problems such as large (impractical) 
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area and very low clock frequency. To solve this problem, it is proposed to use a scalable 
hardware design that performs the same function operating with higher clock frequency. 
The scalable hardware is also a module that can handle operands of any size. Based on the 
hardware area and performance requirements, the word-size, on which the module 
operates, is selected. The upper limit on the operand precision is dictated only by the 
available memory to store the operands and internal results. The scalable module is in 
principle capable of performing infinite-precision Montgomery inverse computation of an 
integer, modulo a prime number. This scalable hardware is compared with the fixed 
precision design showing very attractive results. 
The longest path of the hardware designs passes through adders and subtractors. 
Chapter 4 contains the analysis of the impact of faster adders and subtractors in the 
hardware. Experimental performance results for the designs (fixed precision and scalable) 
using carry-look-ahead adders instead of carry-ripple adders are presented. 
In Chapter 5, we propose a complete GF(p) Montgomery inversion (MonInv) 
procedure (almost Montgomery inverse plus correction phase). We modify the original 
procedure presented in [1] by replacing the Montgomery product used in its correction 
phase by a new straightforward correction phase. The advantage of the new correction 
phase is that it is implemented with roughly the same scalable hardware of the almost 
Montgomery inverse algorithm described in Chapter 3. The concept of multiple-bit shifting 
is also introduced in the proposed MonInv design. 
Chapter 6 proposes a scalable and unified architecture for a Montgomery inverse 
hardware that operates in both GF(p) and GF(2n) fields. We present a GF(2n) Montgomery 
inverse algorithm that accommodates multi-bit shifting making it very similar to the GF(p) 
algorithm of Chapter 5.  
The conclusion chapter (Chapter 7) summarizes the results of this thesis work and 
provides some future work in this area.  
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2 ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In 1985 Niel Koblitz and Victor Miller proposed the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
(ECC) [9-11,28-33], a method based on the Discrete Logarithm problem over the points on 
an elliptic curve (EC). Since that time, ECC has received considerable attention from 
mathematicians around the world, and no significant breakthroughs have been made in 
determining weaknesses in the algorithm [32,40,41]. Although critics are still skeptical as 
to the reliability of this method, several ECC encryption techniques have been developed 
recently. The fact that the problem appears so difficult to crack means that key sizes can be 
reduced in size considerably, even exponentially [29,33], especially when compared to the 
key size used by other cryptosystems. ECC became an alternative to RSA, one of the most 
popular public key methods. ECC offers the same level of security as RSA but with much 
smaller key size [29].  
In order to use ECC, an elliptic curve must be defined over a specific finite field. The 
EC arithmetic can be optimized depending on the type of finite field. The most popular 
finite fields used in ECC are Galois Fields, GF(p) and GF(2n) [9,12,28,29]. The following 
section will give some background on the EC theory followed by a comparison between 
ECC arithmetic performed in GF(p) and GF(2n). Then, some ECC applications will be 
introduced to give an idea of how ECC can be used.  
 
 
2.2 Elliptic Curve Theory 
 
Elliptic curves are described by cubic equations, similar to those used in ellipsis 
calculations. The general form for an elliptic curve equation is:  
y2+axy+by=x3+cx2+dx+e. 
There is also a single element named the point at infinity or the zero point denoted ϕ. The 
point at infinity is computed as the sum of any three points on an EC that lie on a straight 
line. If a point on the EC is added to another point on the curve or to itself, some special 
 10
addition rules are applied depending on the finite field being used and also on the type of 
coordinate system (affine or projective) its applied to. 
As mentioned earlier, a finite field is a set of elements that have a finite order (number 
of elements). There are many ways of representing the elements of the finite field. Some 
representations may lead to more efficient implementations of the field arithmetic in 
hardware or in software. The EC arithmetic is more or less complex depending on the 
finite field where the EC is applied and in which coordinate system the computation is 
performed. GF(p) and GF(2n), in affine and projective coordinates are considered in this 
research because they are the most used in ECC [9,11,28,29].  
 
 
2.2.1 Elliptic Curves over Finite Field GF(p) 
 
GF(p) is comprised of the set of integers: {0, 1, 2, . . . . . ., p-2, p-1}. In this field, the 
basic arithmetic operations are: 
• Addition: a+b= r; where: r,a,b ∈GF(p), r is the remainder of (a+b) divided by p. This 
is known as addition modulo p. 
• Multiplication: a . b=s; where a,b,s ∈GF(p), s is the remainder of ab divided by p. 
This is known as multiplication modulo p. 
• Squaring:  a2 = a . a = s; where a,s ∈GF(p), s is the remainder of a2 divided by p. 
Squaring can be assumed as multiplication modulo p.  
• Inversion: Assume a is a non-zero element in GF(p), the inverse of a modulo p, 
denoted a-1, is the unique integer c ∈ GF(p),  for which  a . c = 1.  
 
The EC arithmetic over GF(p) is the usual mod p arithmetic. The EC equation in GF(p) 
is: y2 = x3 + ax + b; where p > 3, 4a3 + 27b2≠ 0, and x, y, a, b ∈ GF(p).  
The special addition rules in this field are the following: 
ϕ =  -ϕ 
( x, y ) + ϕ = ( x, y ) 
( x, y ) + ( x, -y) = ϕ 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Affine Coordinates 
 
The addition of two different points on the EC in affine coordinates is computed as: 
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(x1 , y1) + (x2 , y2) = (x3 , y3) ; where x1 ≠ x2 
λ = (y2  y1)/(x2  x1) 
x3 = λ2  x1  x2 
y3 = λ(x1  x3)  y1 
 
The addition of a point to itself (doubling a point) is computed as: 
(x1 , y1) + (x1 , y1) = (x3 , y3) ; where x1 ≠ 0 
λ = (3(x1)2 + a) /(2y1) 
x3 = λ2  2x1 
y3 = λ(x1  x3)  y1 
 
We assume in this work that the squaring calculation is equivalent to a multiplication. 
Thus, to add two different points in GF(p) we need: six additions, one inversion, and three 
multiplication operations. To double a point we require: four additions, one inversion, and 
four multiplications. 
 
 
2.2.1.2 Projective Coordinates 
 
The projective coordinates are used to almost eliminate the need for performing 
inversion [11,28]. For elliptic curve defined over GF(p), the normal elliptic point (x,y) is 
projected to (X,Y,Z), where x=X/Z2,and y=Y/Z3 [11]. This transformation between affine 
and projective coordinates is performed only twice: at the beginning and at the end.   
The point addition of P+Q in projective coordinates is computed as: 
     P = (X1,Y1,Z1); Q = (X2,Y2,Z2); P+Q = (X3,Y3,Z3); where P ≠ ±Q  
     (x, y) = (X/Z2,Y/Z3) ! (X,Y,Z)    
λ1 = X1Z22         
λ2 = X2Z12         
λ3 = λ1 - λ2       
λ4 = Y1Z23        
λ5 = Y2Z13        
λ6 = λ4 - λ5      
λ7 = λ1 + λ2      
λ8 = λ4 + λ5      
Z3 = Z1Z2λ3       
X3 = λ62 - λ7λ32      
λ9 = λ7λ32  2X3      
Y3 = (λ9λ6 - λ8λ33)/2   
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The doubling of a point (P+P) in projective coordinates is computed as: 
P = (X1,Y1,Z1); P+P = (X3,Y3,Z3)  
(x, y) = (X/Z2,Y/Z3) ! (X,Y,Z)    
λ1 = 3X12 + aZ14        
Z3 = 2Y1Z1        
λ2 = 4X1 Y12          
X3 = λ12 - 2λ2        
λ3 = 8Y14        
λ4 = λ2 - X3   
Y3 = λ1 λ4  X3    
            
The squaring calculation in GF(p) is very similar to the multiplication computation. The 
number of multiplication processes for adding two points is found to be sixteen, while the 
number of operations for doubling a point is found to be only ten.  
 
 
2.2.2 Elliptic Curves over Finite Field GF(2n) 
 
GF(2n) is called a characteristic two field or a binary finite field. It can be viewed as a 
vector space of dimension n over the field GF(2) that consists of the elements 0 and 1. That 
is, there exist n elements x0 , x1 , x2 . . . , xn-1 in GF(2n) such that each element x ∈ GF(2n) 
can be uniquely written in the form: x = a0 x0 + a1x1 . . . + an-1xn-1 ; where ai∈GF(2). Such 
a set {x0 , x1 , x2 . . . , xn-1} is called the basis of GF(2n) over GF(2). Given such a basis, a 
field element x can be represented as the bit string (a0 a1 . . . an-1). Addition of field 
elements is performed by bit-wise XOR-ing their vector representations. The complexity of 
multiplication depends on the selected basis. There are many different basis of GF(2n) over 
GF(2). Some basis lead to more efficient software or hardware implementations of the 
arithmetic in GF(2n) than others. The most popular basis are the polynomial (or standard) 
and the normal basis.  
The EC equation over GF(2n) is: y2+xy = x3+ax2+b ; where x, y, a, b ∈ GF(2n) and b≠0.  
The addition rules in this field are as the following: 
ϕ + ϕ =  ϕ 
( x, y ) + ϕ = ( x, y ) 
( x, y ) + ( x, x+y) = ϕ 
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2.2.2.1 Affine Coordinates 
 
The affine coordinates addition of two different points on the EC is computed as: 
(x1 , y1) + (x2 , y2) = (x3 , y3) ; where x1 ≠ x2 
λ = (y2 + y1)/(x2 + x1) 
x3 = λ2 + λ + x1 + x2 + a 
y3 = λ(x1 + x3) +  x3 + y1 
 
The affine coordinates addition of a point to itself (doubling a point) is computed as: 
(x1 , y1) + (x1 , y1) = (x3 , y3) ; where x1 ≠ 0 
λ = x1 + (y1)/(x1) 
x3 = λ2 + λ + a  
y3 = (x1)2 + (λ + 1) x3 
 
To add two different points in GF(2n) we need: nine additions, one inversion, one 
squaring, and two multiplication operations. To double a point we require: five additions, 
one inversion, two squarings, and two multiplications. 
 
 
2.2.2.2 Projective Coordinates 
 
Calculating the inverse is the most expensive operation. Designs replace the inversion 
by several multiplication operations by representing the elliptic curve points as projective 
coordinate points [11,28,30,32]. To almost eliminate the need for performing inversion in 
GF(2k), its coordinates (x,y) are to be projected to (X,Y,Z), where x=X/Z2, and y=Y/Z3. The 
elliptic curve equation in this system is:  Y2 + XYZ = X 3 + a X2Z2+ b Z6 [11]. 
The point doubling of an elliptic curve point (P+P) in projective coordinates is computed 
as: 
P = (X1,Y1,Z1); P+P = (X3,Y3,Z3) 
Z3 = X1 Z12   
X3 = (X1 + bZ12)4   
λ  = Z3 + X12 + Y1 Z1  
Y3 = X14 Z3 + λ X3  
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The point addition of two elliptic curve points (P+Q) is computed as: 
P = (X1,Y1,Z1); Q = (X2,Y2,Z2); P+Q = (X3,Y3,Z3); where P ≠ ±Q  
(x, y) = (X/Z2,Y/Z3) ! (X,Y,Z) 
λ1 = X1 Z22    
λ2 = X2 Z12    
λ3 = λ1 + λ2   
λ4 = Y1 Z23    
λ5 = Y2 Z13    
λ6 = λ4 + λ5 
λ7 = Z1 λ3     
λ8 = λ6 X2 + λ7Y2   
Z3 = λ7 Z2    
λ9 = λ6  + Z3 
X3 = a Z32 + λ6 λ9 + λ33  
Y3 = λ9 X3 + λ8 λ72   
 
The number of multiplication processes for adding two points is found to be twenty, while 
it is found to be ten for doubling a point. 
 
 
2.2.3 Comparing Arithmetic Complexity on GF(p) and GF(2n) 
 
The number of operations for affine coordinates addition of two different points is 
found to be basically the same (in GF(p) and GF(2n)), as shown in Table 2.1. The 
computation of λ requires one inversion and one multiplication. Computing x3 needs 
only one squaring. The value of y3 is obtained with one multiplication. The number of 
operations in both fields is identical: one inversion, one squaring, and two multiplications, 
neglecting the addition, subtraction, and multiplication by small numbers [11,28].  
 
 
Point operations Operations in GF(p) Operations in GF(2n) 
Point addition 1 Inversion  
3 Multiplications 
1 Inversion 
3 Multiplications 
Point doubling 1 Inversion  
4 Multiplications 
1 Inversion 
4 Multiplications 
 
Table 2.1 Comparing GF(p) and GF(2n) number of lengthy point operations  
in affine coordinates  
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Point doubling on affine coordinates requires the computation of λ, which in GF(p) 
requires an inversion, a multiplication, and a squaring of x1, while it needs an inversion and 
a multiplication in GF(2n). Calculating x3 in both fields requires the same operation of 
squaring lambda. Computing y3 in GF(p) requires only one multiplication, while it needs 
a multiplication and a squaring in GF(2n). The number of operations is found to be the 
same in both fields: one inversion, two squarings, and two multiplications [11,28]. 
Considering projective coordinates (Table 2.2), the number of multiplication 
processes for adding two points in GF(p) is found to be sixteen, while it is found to be 
twenty in GF(2n). The number of multiplication calculations for doubling a point is found 
to be ten in both GF(p) and GF(2n). This shows that GF(p) projective coordinates 
consumes four less number of multiplications than GF(2n), however, comparison of the 
number of operations is not accurate because operations in GF(p) require different time 
than GF(2n). Computations in GF(p) require lengthy time due to the delay of propagating 
the carry, which GF(2n) does not have. 
 
 
Point operations Operations in GF(p) Operations in GF(2n) 
Point addition 16 Multiplications 20 Multiplications 
Point doubling 10 Multiplications 10 Multiplications 
 
Table 2.2 Comparing GF(p) and GF(2n) number of lengthy point operations  
in projective coordinates  
 
 
2.2.4 The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
 
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is the fundamental mathematical 
property that supports elliptic curves cryptography. The problem can be clarified by 
considering E as an elliptic curve and P and Q as points on E; the discrete logarithm 
problem consists in finding an integer k such that kP=Q, if such an integer exists. Figuring 
the integer k is considered a very hard problem especially if the numbers are large [11]. On 
the other hand, if integer k and the EC point P are known, computing the other EC point Q 
is possible. The ECC algorithm used for calculating kP (scalar multiplication of k by P, 
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which is equivalent to add P to itself k times) from P is the binary method, since it is 
known to be efficient and practical to implement [11,12,29,32]. The binary method 
algorithm is: 
Define n: number of bits in k;  
ki: the ith bit of k  
Input:  P (a point on the elliptic curve). 
Output: Q = kP (another point on the elliptic curve). 
1.  if kn-1 = 1, then Q:=P else Q:=0; 
2.  for i = n-2 down to 0; 
3.   Q := Q+Q ; 
4.   if ki = 1 then Q:= Q+P ;  
5.  return Q; 
 
The binary method algorithm scans the binary representation of k and doubles the point Q 
n-times. Whenever, a particular bit of k is found to be one, an extra operation is needed. 
This extra operation is Q+P. 
 
 
2.2.5 Comparing Arithmetic Complexity of Affine and Projective Coordinates 
 
The basic ECC operation consists in computing the point kP from P. Lets use the 
binary algorithm presented in Section 2.2.4. The number of binary bits of integer k is n, 
which indicates the exact number of point doublings but not point additions. Assume that 
the bits of k are half ones and half zeros (an average estimation for comparison reasons). 
The EC arithmetic operations required are n point doublings and n/2 point additions. The 
total number of multiplications and inversions for both GF(p) and GF(2n) are listed in 
Table 2.3. If the time to compute 1.5n inversions and 5.5n multiplications is less than 18n 
GF(p) multiplications or 20n GF(2n) multiplications, then the system based affine 
coordinates is faster than the one based on projective coordinates. In other words, if one 
inversion is calculated in less than approximately nine multiplications, then the affine 
coordinate arithmetic is more appropriate to use than the projective coordinates. 
In any case, even with projective coordinates, the inverse computation is still needed 
at the end of the computation to convert back to affine coordinates and cannot be 
eliminated completely [1,2,11], which justifies the need to research the alternatives for the 
design of inverse operation in hardware. 
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Finite Affine Coordinates Operations Projective Coordinates operations 
Field n doublings & n/2 point additions 
GF(p) 18n Multiplications 
GF(2n) 
1.5n Inversions &  
5.5n Multiplications 20n Multiplications 
 
Table 2.3 Comparing the affine and projective coordinates  
  
 
2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Applications 
 
As described earlier (Section 2.2.4), it is easy to calculate the point kP from P. 
However, it is very hard to determine the value of k knowing the two points: kP and P. 
This property leads to several algorithms for cryptography [29,32]. Some of these 
techniques will be introduced in the following subsections. 
 
 
2.3.1 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Method 
 
Secret key cryptosystems are normally used for encryption/decryption purposes, 
because it is faster than public key cryptosystems. Secret key cryptosystems require a 
secret key to be agreed upon before the cryptographic process starts. This agreement can be 
performed by the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman [29] key exchange method as described by 
the following example. 
Suppose that users A and B want to agree upon a secret key, which will be used for 
secret key cryptography. Users A and B choose a finite field, GF(p) for example, and an 
elliptic curve E defined over this field. They also take a randomly chosen point P=(x,y) 
lying on the elliptic curve E; we refer to P as the base point of the cryptosystem. The finite 
field, the elliptic curve, and the base point are all publicly known. 
User A then randomly chooses a large integer a∈GF(p) and keeps a secret. User A 
now computes the point aP which will lie on E. User B does the same: B randomly 
chooses a large integer b and computes bP. Both A and B make aP and bP publicly known. 
These are their public keys. The secret key that A and B use to encrypt messages sent to 
each other is abP, which both A and B can compute. User A knows a and bP, and so can 
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find abP. Whereas, B knows b and aP, and so can find abP. The security of this system 
lies in the fact that a third party C, for example, knows only aP and bP, and unless C can 
solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem there is no efficient way to break the 
encryption. 
  
 
2.3.2 Elliptic Curve Encryption/Decryption 
 
There are many ways to apply elliptic curves for encryption/decryption purposes [29]. 
A simple method is presented here to give the flavor of elliptic curve encryption/ 
decryption techniques. Assume working with GF(p) finite field and an elliptic curve E. The 
users randomly chose a base point Pbase, lying on the elliptic curve E. The plaintext (the 
original message to be encrypted) is coded into an elliptic curve point Pm. Each user selects 
a private key n and compute his public key P = nPbase. For example, user As private key 
is nA and his public key is PA = nAPbase. 
For any one to encrypt and send the message point Pm to user A, he/she needs to 
choose a random integer k and generate the ciphertext Cm = {kPbase , Pm+kPA }. The 
ciphertext pair of points uses As public key, where only user A can decrypt the plaintext 
using his private key. 
To decrypt the ciphertext Cm, the first point in the pair of Cm, kPbase, is multiplied by 
As private key to get the point: nA(kPbase). Then this point is subtracted from the second 
point of Cm, the result will be the plaintext point Pm. The decryption  operations are:  
(Pm + kPA) - nA(kPbase) = Pm + k(nAPbase) - nA(kPbase) = Pm 
 
 
2.3.3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
 
The process of ECDSA [29] is composed of three main steps: key generation, 
signature generation and signature verification. Each step is described as follows: 
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2.3.3.1 ECDSA key generation 
 
Each user of the scheme does the following: 
1. Select an elliptic curve E over a finite field, say GF(p). The number of points on E 
should be divisible by a large prime n. 
2. Select a point P = (x,y) ∈ GF(p) of order n. 
3. Select a random integer d in the range [1, n-1]. 
4. Compute dP = Q. 
5. The user's public key is (Q, n, P, E); the user's private key is d. 
 
 
2.3.3.2 ECDSA signature generation 
 
To sign a message, m, the user does the following: 
1. Select a random integer k in the range [1, n-1]. 
2. Compute kP=(x1, y1), and set x1 mod n = r. If r is zero then go back to step 1. In other 
words, if r=0 then the signing equation will not involve the private key d. 
3. Compute k-1mod n. 
4. Compute s = k-1(h(m) + dr) mod n, where h is the hash value obtained from a suitable 
hash function. 
5. If s=0 go to step 1. This because if s is zero then s-1 mod n does not exist and we would 
not be able to verify the signature.  
6. The signature to be included in the message m is the pair of integers (s, r). 
 
 
2.3.3.3 ECDSA signature verification 
 
To verify the signature (r, s) on the message m, the following should be done: 
1. Obtain an authentic copy of the public key (Q, n, P, E). 
2. Verify that r and s are integers in the range [1, n-1]. 
3. Compute w = s-1 mod n  and h(m). 
4. Compute u1= h(m).w mod n and u2 = r.w mod n. 
5. Compute u2Q + u1P = (x0 , y0) and v = x0 mod n. 
6. Accept the signature if and only if r= v. 
 
 
In the above ECDSA algorithms, each user generates their own elliptic curve E, along 
with a base point P. However, this means that the public key sizes become quite large. If, 
instead, the users agree upon a fixed curve E and base point P, as system parameters, then 
each user needs only to define the point Q, which is then all that is included in the public 
key. 
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3 SCALABLE HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE FOR GF(p) ALMOST 
MONTGOMERY MODULAR INVERSE COMPUTATION 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Modular inversion is often performed by algorithms based on the Extended Euclidean 
algorithm [11]. Several inversion hardware attempts are described in the literature [16-
18,20-25]. Most of the research [17,18,20-25] proposed hardware designs for inversion in 
Galois Fields GF(2n). Several [17,18,21-25] are based upon parallelism of data flow in an 
array structure. The inversion in GF(2n) is fast due to the elimination of the carry 
propagation delay in GF(2n) calculations. However, the area used in parallel organizations 
are very large, of order O(n2). Hasan in [20] proposed a design of the inversion algorithm 
that is smaller in area and still keeps a fair speed. He performed a word-by-word 
computation of the numbers instead of computing the whole numbers in parallel. Since we 
focus on GF(p), the designs proposed in [17,18, 21-25] have no direct link to this work. 
Takagi in [16], proposed an inverse algorithm for hardware with a redundant binary 
representation. Each number is represented by digits in the set {0,1,-1}. Redundant 
representation is used to reduce the carry propagation delay problem. However, it requires 
more area. It also needs data transformation that is usually expensive.  
The Montgomery modular inverse algorithm suitable for our research is presented in 
[1]. The algorithm requires two main operations: a Montgomery product and an almost 
Montgomery inverse (AlmMonInv) operation. This Chapter is directed towards the 
implementation of the AlmMonInv. The Montgomery product is beyond the scope of this 
work and scalable Montgomery multipliers, such as the ones proposed in [6-8] can 
generate it. 
Two AlmMonInv designs are presented in this Chapter, namely a fixed precision 
design and a scalable hardware design. The fixed precision design is fully parallel and 
processes full precision numbers at every clock cycle. The scalable hardware, however, 
divides the numbers in words where each word is processed in a clock cycle. We show that 
the scalable hardware is more appropriate for cryptographic applications. 
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3.2 Montgomery Inverse Algorithms  
 
Two Montgomery modular inverse studies are found in the literature [1,2]. Both 
modify a technique proposed by Kaliski in 1995 [3], to make it more suitable and faster for 
cryptography using Montgomerys idea. Kaliski method, derived from the extended 
Euclidean algorithm [3], basically takes an integer a, and produces x, where x=a-12m mod p. 
If a is an integer, the algorithm will calculate the inverse of a, but represented in 
Montgomery domain, as shown in Figure 3.1. When the number a is already in 
Montgomery domain, the application of Kaliskis routine will not give the needed 
Montgomery inverse result. Thus, some extra arithmetic operations are required to get it. 
Kaliski method is summarized next. It is followed by a brief explanation of two 
modifications to Kaliskis work to make it compute the Montgomery inverse and to make 
it faster.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Types of input/output numbers for Kaliski algorithm 
 
 
3.2.1 Kaliski Algorithm 
 
Kaliski algorithm [1,3] is shown below and it is divided in two phases. Phase one, also 
called almost Montgomery inverse (AlmMonInv) in this work, takes the inputs a and p and 
give outputs r and k; where r = a-12k mod p, and n < k<2n (n is the actual number of bits of 
the modulus p). Phase two takes the outputs of phase one as its inputs, and gives the final 
result of Kaliski algorithm: x = a-12m mod p. Note that in both phases the integers: a and x 
are within the range [1,p-1]. Kaliskis two phases are outlined as follows:  
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Phase One: Almost Montgomery Inverse, AlmMonInv(a) 
Input:    a and p; where a is in the range [1,p-1]. 
Output: r and k; where r = a-12k mod p, n < k < 2n, n = number of bits of p 
1. u = p; v = a; r = 0; and s = 1  
2. k = 0 
3. while (v > 0)  
4.  if u is even then u = u/2; s = 2s 
5.  else if v is even then v = v/2; r = 2r 
6.  else if u > v then u = (u - v)/2; r = r+s; s = 2s 
7.  else v = (v - u)/2; s = s+r; r = 2r 
8.  k = k + 1 
9. if r ≥ p then  r = r - p 
10. return r = p - r 
 
Phase Two 
Input:    r,p,k & m; where r & k from phase one, & m≥ n (m=Montgomery constant) 
Output: x; where x = a-12m mod p  
11. for i = 1 to k - m do 
12.  if r is even then r = r/2 
13.  else r = (r + p)/2 
14. return x = r 
 
 
3.2.2 Modifications to Kaliski Algorithm 
 
T. Kobayashi and H. Morita in 1999 [2], proposed techniques for modular inversion to 
make it more than five times faster than the original Kaliski routine. They gained speed 
from the comparison of the values of u and v (step 6), they compare the most significant 
word only. Their way to achieve more speed consisted in combining the multiplication and 
the shifting operations. Long numbers were divided into words. They modified the 
AlmMonInv algorithm by performing several matrix multiplications, instead of the simple 
multiplications by two. The modification was targeted toward software implementations. 
In July 2000, Savas and Koç [1] proposed to replace phase two of Kaliskis algorithm 
with a Montgomery multiplication, which resulted in a faster process. They also presented 
a complete Montgomery modular inverse algorithm by adding extra Montgomery 
multiplication operations. These extra multiplications are performed after the AlmMonInv. 
The Montgomery inverse computation algorithm in [1] is outlined below: 
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Montgomery Inverse Algorithm 
Input:    a2m (mod p), p, n, m, and R2mod p 
Output: x = a-12m mod p, where x is in the range [1,p-1]. 
1. (r,k) = AlmMonInv(a2m); where r = a-12-m2k mod p, and n ≤ k ≤ m+n 
2. If n ≤ k ≤ m then 
2.1  r = MonPro(r,R2) = (a-12-m2k)(a2m)(2-m) = a-1 2k  mod p  
2.2  k = k+m > m 
3. r = MonPro(r,R2) = (a-12-m2k)(22m)(2-m) = a-12k  mod p 
4. r = MonPro(r, 22m-k) = (a-12k)(a2m-k)(2-m) = a-12m mod p 
5. Return x = r; where x = a-12m mod p 
 
 
The input parameters are the integers aR mod p (residue representation of a), n, m 
and p (the modulus, a prime number of size n-bits, m ≥ n), and R2mod p (a pre-computed 
integer based on the Montgomery radix, R = 2m [1]). The two main procedures used in the 
Montgomery inverse algorithm are the Montgomery product (MonPro) and the almost 
Montgomery inverse (AlmMonInv) [1], modeled in hardware as shown in Figure 3.2. Our 
contribution consists in the implementation of the almost Montgomery inverse procedure 
in hardware. The MonPro is beyond the scope of this work. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The complete Montgomery modular inverse hardware 
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3.3 The Fixed Precision Design 
 
This section discuses a fixed precision hardware design. We present some hardware 
issues applied to the algorithm to compute the almost Montgomery inverse (AlmMonInv) 
subroutine, which is basically phase-one of Kaliskis algorithm.  
 
 
3.3.1 Hardware Issues Applied to the Algorithm 
 
When observed from hardware point-of-view, the AlmMonInv algorithm contains 
operations that are easily mapped to hardware features. For example, one-bit shifting the 
binary representation of number u to the right (ShiftR(u,1)) is equivalent to perform 
division by two, or one-bit shifting s to the left (ShiftL(s,1)) is equal to do multiplication 
by two. Checking for a number to be even or odd requires a test of the least significant bit 
(LSB). If it is found to be zero the number is even, otherwise the number is odd. The 
comparison of two numbers to see which one is bigger is performed after subtracting one 
from the other. If the subtraction result is positive (the borrow-bit is zero) the first number 
is bigger, or vice-versa. Such hardware mapping is shown in the hardware algorithm 
below: 
 
The Fixed Precision Hardware AlmMonInv Algorithm (FHW-Alg) 
Registers:  u, v, r, s, and p (all five registers are to hold n-bits). 
Input:  a ∈ [1, p -1], p = modulus.  
Output:  result ∈ [1, p -1] and k; where result = a-12k (mod p) and n<k<2n 
1.     u = p; v = a; r = 0; s = 1; k = 0 
2.     if (u0 = 0) then { u = ShiftR(u,1) ; s = ShiftL(s,1)}; go to step 7 
3.     if (v0 = 0) then: { v = ShiftR(v,1) ; r = ShiftL(r,1)}; go to step 7 
4.     S1 = Subtract (u, v); S2 = Subtract (v, u); A1 = Add (r, s)  
5.     if (S1borrow = 0) then {u = ShiftR(S1,1)); r = A1; s = ShiftL(s,1)}; go to step 7 
6.     s = A1; v = ShiftR(S2,1); r = ShiftL(r,1)  
7.     k = k + 1 
8.     if (v ≠ 0) go to step 2 
9.     S1 = Subtract (p, r), S2 = Subtract (2p, r)  
10.   if (S1borrow = 0) then {return result = S1}; else {return result = S2} 
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Consider step 6 of AlmMonInv, if u>v then the subtraction (u-v) takes place, 
otherwise, the subtraction (v-u) is calculated. In the worst case, two subtraction operations 
are performed, because the comparison of u and v may be accomplished through 
subtraction of u and v anyway. These two subtractions can be done in parallel (two 
subtraction modules) as shown in step 4 of FHW-Alg. The same case applies to step 9 and 
step 10 of AlmMonInv, both subtractions may be performed in parallel.  
All actual integers are represented by n-bit vectors, such as u = (un-1,un-2,..,u2,u1,u0). 
The modulus is loaded into register u at step 1, then, register u is modified along with the 
algorithm. The modulus is essential at steps 9 and 10 (FHW-Alg) and for this reason, it is 
stored in a special register named p. The value of r cannot equal p except when a equals 
infinity. Thus, the result of AlmMonInv equals either 2p-r if r is greater than p, or p-r 
when r is less than p, as described in step 10 of FHW-Alg. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Fixed Precision Hardware Design 
 
The fixed precision design is made up of a memory unit, a controller, a k-counter, and 
a data path (arithmetic unit). The block diagram for this hardware design is shown in 
Figure 3.3. All data buses are nmax bits wide (nmax is the maximum number of bits the 
hardware can handle). The memory unit is made of five registers u, v, r, s and p to hold 
nmax bits each. The memory unit sends out all its content and loads new ones at every clock 
cycle, except for register p that does not change during the computation. The data path 
(DP) takes the memory unit outputs and gives back the computed data to be stored through 
buses: u_out, v_out, r_out, and s_out. For example, in step 3 of FHW-Alg, only v and r are 
modified. However, the DP provides the data to all four buses. Buses v_out and r_out are 
found to be modifications of v and r, while u_out and s_out are just the same u and s fed 
back. 
The DP performs the required computation depending on the LSBs of u and v, as 
clarified by FHW-Alg. It contains several multiplexers to route and shift the data buses to 
perform steps 2, 3, 5, 6 and 10, as shown in Figure 3.4. It consists of an adder and two 
subtractors to perform steps 4 and 9. The counter unit performs step 7 of FHW-Alg. All the 
components in the design are directed and synchronized by the controller. 
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Figure 3.3 The block diagram of implementing the FHW-Alg 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The fixed precision hardware data path 
u_out
v_out 
s_out
r_out 
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3.4 The Scalable Design  
 
 
3.4.1 Why scalable design? 
 
Application specific hardware architectures are usually designed to deal with a 
specific maximum number of bits, 512-bits for example. If this number of bits is to be 
increased, even by one, the complete hardware needs to be replaced. In addition to that, if 
the design is implemented for a large number of bits, the hardware is huge and its longest 
path usually is impractical. It will cause the hardware to run at a very low clock frequency 
unless architectural changes are applied. These issues motivated the search for a scalable 
hardware similar to what is proposed by Tenca and Koç in their Scalable Architecture for 
Montgomery Multiplication [6]. 
The scalable architecture solves the previous problems with the following three 
hardware features. First, the designs longest path should be short and independent of the 
operands length. Second, it is designed in such a way that it fits in restricted hardware 
regions (flexible area). Finally, it can handle the computation of numbers in a repetitive 
way up to a certain limit usually imposed by the size of the memory in the design. If the 
number of bits in the data exceeds the memory size, the memory unit is replaced while the 
scalable computing unit is not changed.  
 
 
3.4.2 Scalable Hardware Issues Applied to the Algorithm 
 
Differently from what happens in the fixed precision hardware design, the scalable 
hardware has multi-precision operators for addition, subtraction and comparison. The 
subtraction used for comparison (u > v), is performed on a word-by-word basis until all the 
actual data words are processed, then, the subtractor borrow out bit is used to decide on the 
result. Also, depending on the subtraction completion, variable r or s has to be shifted. All 
variables, u, v, r and s, need to remain as is until the subtraction processes complete, and 
the borrow out bit appears. Such a constraint forced the use of three more variables: x, y 
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and z; where x= u-v, y= v-u and z= r+s. These variables are stored in extra registers as 
outlined in the scalable algorithm. 
 
The Scalable Hardware Algorithm (SHW-Alg) 
Registers: u, v, r, s, x, y, z & p (all eight registers are to hold nmax bits). 
Input:       a ∈ [1, p-1], p = modulus.  
Output:    result ∈ [1,p-1] & k; where result = a-12k(mod p) & n<k<2n, (n < nmax) 
1.      u = p; v = a; r = 0; s = 1; x = 0; y = 0;  z = 0; k = 0 
2.      if (u0 = 0) then { u = ShiftR(u,1) ; s = ShiftL(s,1) }; go to step 7 
3.      if (v0 = 0) then { v = ShiftR(v,1) ; r = ShiftL(r,1) }; go to step 7 
4.      x = Subtract (u, v); y = Subtract (v, u); z =Add (r, s)  
5.     if (xborrow=0)then{u= ShiftR(x,1); r = z; s = ShiftL(s,1)}; goto step7 
6.      s = z;  v = ShiftR(y,1); r = ShiftL(r,1) 
7.      k := k + 1 
8.      if (v ≠ 0) go to step 2 
9.      x = Subtract (p, r); y = Subtract (2p, r)  
10.    if (xborrow = 0) then {return result = x};  else {return result = y} 
 
All operations (addition, subtraction, and shifting) of the scalable hardware algorithm 
are multi-precision computations. In other words, the numbers are utilized in each 
operation on a word-by-word basis until the entire number is processed. 
 
 
3.4.3 The Scalable Hardware Design 
 
The scalable hardware design is built of two main parts, a memory unit and a 
computing unit. The memory unit is not scalable because it has a limited storage defined 
by the value nmax. The data values of a and p are first loaded in the memory unit. Then, the 
computing unit read/write (modify) the data using a word size of w bits. The computing 
unit is completely scalable. It is designed to handle w bits every clock cycle. The 
computing unit does not know the total number of bits, nmax, the memory is holding. It 
computes until the controller indicates that all operands words were processed. Note that 
the actual numbers used may have much less than nmax bits. 
The block diagram for the scalable hardware is shown in Figure 3.5. The memory unit 
is connected to the computing unit components. The computing unit is made of four 
hardware blocks, add/subtract block, shifter block, data router block, and the controller. All 
these computing unit blocks are briefly clarified after describing the non-scalable memory 
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unit. The memory unit contains a counter to compute k (step 7 of SHW-Alg) and eight 
first-in-first-out (FIFO) registers used to store the algorithms variables. All registers, u, v, 
r, s, x, y, z and p, are limited to hold at most nmax bits. Each FIFO register has its own reset 
signal generated by the controller. They have counters (ncounter bits each) to keep track of n 
(the number of bits actually used by the application). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 The scalable hardware overall block diagram 
  
 
The add/subtract unit is built of an adder, two subtractors, four flip-flops, three 
multiplexers, a comparator, and logic gates, connected as shown in Figure 3.6. This unit 
performs one of two operations, either to calculate step 4 of SHW-Alg: x = u-v, y = v-u, 
and z = r+s, or to calculate step 9: x = p-r and y = 2p-r. Three flip-flops are used to hold 
the intermediate carry-bit of the adder and borrow-bits of the two subtractors to implement 
the multi-precision operations. The fourth flip-flop is used to store a flag that keeps track 
of the comparison between u and v. This flag is used to perform step 8 of SHW-Alg. The 
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first subtractor borrow out bit is connected to the controller through a signal that is useful 
only at the end of the each multi-precision addition/subtraction operation. It will affect the 
flow of the operation to choose either step 5 or step 6 of SHW-Alg. It is also essential in 
choosing the final result observed in step 10 of SHW-Alg. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 The scalable add/subtract unit 
 
 
The shifter is made of two registers with special mapping of some data bits, as shown 
in Figure 3.7. Two types of shifting are needed in the hardware algorithm, shifting an 
operand (u or v) through the uv bus one bit to the right, and shifting another operand 
(r or s) through the rs bus one bit to the left. The input buses uv and rs are w bits noted in 
figure 3.7 as vectors uv[w-1:0] and rs[w-1:0], respectively. Shifting u or v is performed through 
Register1, which is of size w-1 bits. For each word, all the bits of uv are stored in Register1 
except the least significant bit (uv[0]), it is read out immediately as the most significant bit 
(MSB) of the output bus uv_out (uv_out[w-1]). The MSB of the output of Register2 (vector 
rs_out[w:0], bit rs_out[w]) is mapped as least significant bit (LSB) of the input of Regester2, 
to perform the shifting to the left. 
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Figure 3.7 The scalable hardware shifter 
 
 
The data router is made of ten multiplexers to connect the data going out of the 
memory unit to the inputs of the add/subtract unit or shifter. It also directs the shifted data 
values to go to their required locations in the memory unit. The possible configurations of 
the data router are shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 The data router configurations 
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The controller is the unit that coordinates the flow of data to guide the hardware 
computation. Its made of a state machine easily derived from SHW-Alg. The controller 
does not include counters to avoid any dependency on the number of bits that the system 
can handle. Such modules are left into the memory block. 
 
 
3.5 Modeling and Analysis 
 
Both designs were modeled and simulated in VHDL. The developed VHDL 
implementation of the scalable hardware has two main parameters, namely nmax and w. The 
fixed precision hardware, however, is parameterized by nmax only. Their area and speed are 
presented in this section. We didnt define a specific architecture for the adders and 
subtractors used in the design. Thus, the synthesis tool chooses the best option in terms of 
area from its library of standard cells. The impact of the use of different adders is described 
in Chapter 4. 
 
 
3.5.1 Area Comparison 
 
The exact area of any design depends on the technology and minimum feature size. 
For technology independence, we use the number of NOT-gates as an area measure [14]. A 
CAD tool from Mentor Graphics (Leonardo) was used. Leonardo takes the VHDL design 
code and provides a synthesized model with its area and longest path delay. The target 
technology is a 0.5µm CMOS defined by the AMI0.5 fast library provided in the ASIC 
Design Kit (ADK) from the same Mentor Graphics Company [19]. It has to be mentioned 
here that the ADK is developed for educational purposes and cannot be thoroughly 
compared to technologies adopted for marketable ASICs. It however, provides a 
framework to contrast the scalable hardware with the fixed precision one.  
The only problem we faced with our VHDL code is that Leonardo cannot synthesize 
the scalable design memory unit because of its behavioral parametrizable feature. So we 
present an area function to calculate the scalable design memory. In Table 3.1, the number 
of NOT gates comparable to several standard logic gates is listed [14]. Other logic 
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modules, needed in the memory unit of the scalable design, are constructed from these 
basic gates. These modules and their area are listed in Table 3.2 [13,14]. The modules in 
Table 3.2 are related to nmax and ncounter bits, which are related to each other by the formula: 
ncounter = log2(2nmax+1). 
Thus, nmax is the only parameter controlling the area of the memory unit of the scalable 
design. The memory unit is made of eight registers that hold nmax bits and seventeen 
ncounter bit counters, which totally corresponds to [170 log2(2nmax+1) + 48nmax] gates. 
 
     
Standard gate type Fan-in Number of equivalent NOT gates 
NOT 1 1 
NAND, NOR 2 1 
NAND, NOR 3 2 
NAND 4 2 
NOR 4,5 4 
NAND 5 4 
NAND, NOR 6 5 
NAND, NOR 8 6 
XOR, XNOR 2 3 
XOR, XNOR 3 6 
AND, OR 2,3 2 
AND, OR 4 3 
 
Table 3.1 Area of the standard logic gates 
   
 
Memory Components Building Logic Area (number of NOT gates) 
nmax bit register nmax DFF 6nmax 
ncounter bit counter ncounter DFF +  
ncounter AND +  
ncounter OR 
 
6ncounter+2ncounter+2ncounter 
=10 ncounter 
 
Table 3.2 Area of the modules building the memory unit of the scalable design 
 
 
Using the estimate of the memory block and Leonardos results, it is possible to 
compare the sizes of the two designs in Figure 3.9. Observe that the fixed design has a 
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better area if the maximum number of bits used (nmax) is less than 32. However, this is not 
used in cryptography, as small numbers are useless [11]. In fact, the advantage of the 
scalable hardware is found to make the size of the design as small as possible. For 
example, if nmax=512 bits, the scalable hardware can be designed in less than half the area 
necessary for the fixed precision hardware. 
 
 
 
                    nmax (bits) 
 
Figure 3.9 The area comparison 
 
 
3.5.2 Speed Comparison 
 
The total computation time is a product of the number of clock cycles the algorithm 
takes and the clock period of the VLSI implementation. This number of clock cycles 
depends completely on the data and its computation. For the fixed precision design, the 
number of clock cycles is k+4, where k is the number of iterations counted through the 
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loop, step 2 to step 7 of FHW-Alg. The value of k (FHW-Alg) is within the range [n,2n] 
[1], which justify the use of its average of 3n/2, for comparison purposes. This assumption 
makes the number of clock cycles required for the fixed precision design to complete a 
computation equal to  
Cf = (3n/2) + 4. 
The number of clock cycles in the scalable design is a function of three parameters: k, 
w and n. The number of cycles to compute any scalable addition and/or subtraction is 
calculated as n/w, which makes the actual number of clock cycles depend on the real data 
used and its size. However, after several experiments, we concluded that approximately 
half the time step 2 or 3 of SHW-Alg is needed and the other half step 4 is required. But 
the loop iteration time to execute step 2 or 3 is different than step 4. Step 4 needs extra 
cycles for the shifting operation after it. The number of cycles to perform each loop 
iteration (step 2 to step 7 of SHW-Alg) is calculated as  
CPLI = [(n/w +1)/2]+n/w+3, 
(CPLI stands for the clock cycles per loop iteration). The number of loop iterations of the 
algorithm is exactly equal to k. The overall number of cycles equals the CPLI × k (the 
number of loop iterations), plus the final operation of steps 9 and 10 (SHW-Alg). The total 
number of clock cycles of the scalable hardware equals to  
Cs = 7+(7/2)k+[(4+(3/2)k)(n/w)], 
which was verified by VHDL simulation. If k is approximated to its average of 3n/2 
(similar to the fixed precision design), the function of the clock cycles would be  
Cs = 7+[(21/4) n] + [(4+(9/4) n)(n/w )]. 
The clock period of the hardware designs changes with the value of w in the scalable 
hardware, and changes with the value of nmax in the fixed precision hardware. This is 
because w = nmax in the fixed precision hardware. Two speed comparison studies are 
carried out, one using the synthesize tool clock period for each design (technology 
dependent) and the other uses a technology independent estimation. 
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3.5.2.1 Technology dependent speed comparison 
 
The real time clock period depends on the technology and the efficiency of the CAD 
tool used [13]. Table 3.3 lists the real time clock period for each design generated by 
Leonardo. We excluded the memory unit from all designs when synthesizing for the 
longest path delay assuming its effect will be the same for both scalable and fixed precision 
design, because the scalable design memory unit couldnt be synthesized (Section 3.5.1). 
 
 
Scalable Hardware where w = Fixed Precision  
nmax 4 8 16 32 64 Hardware 
4 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 11.41 
8 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 15.96 
16 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 26.5 
32 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 48 
64 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 92 
128 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 178 
256 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 350 
512 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 694 
1024 9.62 12.39 19.48 30.66 54.93 1382 
 
Table 3.3 Clock cycle period for all designs (nsec) 
 
 
The scalable hardware can have several designs for each nmax depending on w. For 
example, Figure 3.10 shows the delay of five designs of the scalable hardware compared to 
the fixed precision hardware, all modeled for nmax = 256 bits. Observe how the actual data 
size (n) plays a big role on the speed of the designs. In other words, as n reduces for small 
w, the number of clock cycles decrease significantly, which considerably reduces the 
overall computing time of the scalable design. This is a major advantage of the scalable 
hardware over the fixed precision one.  
The number of clock cycles of the fixed precision model depends on the actual size of 
the data used. However, its period always operate on nmax bits. For example, if we are using 
n = 64 bits, and the design is made for nmax = 256 bits, as of Figure 3.10, the fixed 
precision design will assume the operands are using all 256 bits by placing zeros for the 
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unused bits. All nmax bits are processed into the computation causing the fixed precision 
design to have more delay than all different scalable ones. This fact is shown again in 
Figure 3.11 which presents the delay of the designs made for nmax = 512 bits. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Delay comparison of designs with nmax = 256 bits 
 
 
Another observation from Figures 3.10 and 3.11 is that the delay of all the scalable 
designs are better than the fixed precision one when n ≤ nmax/2, except for w = 4 bits that is 
better when n ≤ 3nmax/8. Suppose our design is target to handle 512 bits maximum, as the 
case of Figure 3.11, which is a practical number for future ECC applications [11]. The 
scalable designs with w = 8, 16, 32, and 64 bits are faster than the fixed precision one as 
long as n≤ 256 bits (n ≤ nmax/2). However, for the scalable design with w = 4, it is faster 
than the fixed precision one while n ≤ 192 bits (n ≤ 3nmax/8). In fact, as w gets bigger the 
delay decreases, which is a normal speed area trade-off. 
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Figure 3.11 Delay comparison of designs with nmax = 512 bits 
 
 
3.5.2.2 Technology independent speed comparison 
 
 To have a technology independent speed comparison we use the fact that the designs 
longest path passes through the adders (carry-ripple) and we are going to evaluate the clock 
period as a function of δ (the delay of each full adder). The delays of carry-ripple adders 
depend linearly on the number of bits they are built for, as listed in Table 3.4.  
 
 
Adder number of bits 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 
Estimated delay in δ units 4δ 8δ 16δ 32δ 64δ 128δ 256δ 512δ 
 
Table 3.4 Adders δ delay estimation depending on the number of bits   
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The total time for each design is computed in δ units. For simplicity, consider δ=1 
which results in an estimated total time as a figure of merit. The technology independent 
speed comparison of all designs for nmax=512 bits is shown in Figure 3.12. Observe how 
the graph shows roughly similar behavior to the technology dependent speed comparison 
(Figures 3.10 and 3.11). Another observation from Figure 3.12 is that the scalable designs 
are faster than the fixed precision one as long as: 
n < nmax / 2.5 and w < nmax/4. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Technology independent speed comparison for designs with nmax=512 bits 
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3.6 Summary 
 
This Chapter presents two hardware designs of an algorithm used in the computation 
of Montgomery modular inverse arithmetic. The two designs are the fixed precision 
hardware and the scalable hardware. The scalable architecture makes the designs longest-
path shorter, compared to the fixed precision hardware, with a corresponding higher clock 
frequency. The scalable hardware is also designed to fit in a small area with the 
computation of numbers performed in a repetitive way. The maximum number of bits 
(nmax) the scalable hardware can handle depends only on the memory. If the number of bits 
exceeds the memory size, the memory unit is the only part that needs to be modified, while 
the scalable computing unit does not change. On the other hand, all the fixed precision 
hardware components need to be changed completely if any extra bit is to be added beyond 
the memory limit. 
The scalable design shows area flexibility, depending on the number of bits used at 
each clock cycle (w). For example, if w = 4 bits and the design can handle up to 512 bits, 
the area of the scalable design is 60% less and faster in general than the fixed precision 
hardware. The comparisons show that this scalable structure is very attractive for 
cryptographic systems, particularly for ECC because of its need for modular inversion of 
large numbers, which differ in size repetitively depending on the application usage. 
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4 REDUCING THE CLOCK PERIOD OF THE ALMOST MONTGOMERY 
INVERSE HARDWARE DESIGNS  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The total computation time of the almost Montgomery inverse (AlmMonInv) 
hardware is a product of the number of clock cycles it takes and the clock period. The 
number of clock cycles depends on the input data. The clock cycle period depends on the 
designs critical path, which is dominated by the adders used in the design. In the previous 
chapter, the longest path delay of the proposed designs was put to its maximum due to the 
area optimization option selected for the synthesis phase.  The synthesizer, Leonardo, 
optimized the design for the smallest area, and used the slow but small carry-ripple (CR) 
adders. In this chapter, a delay optimization option is applied that forces the synthesis tool 
to use one-level carry-look-ahead (CLA) adders. This is done to verify the impact of faster 
adders on the system performance and provide a clear idea of the area/time tradeoffs. 
 
 
4.2 Shortening the Critical Path  
 
As mentioned earlier, the critical path of the hardware is through the adders. The CR 
adders are the smallest and slowest adders [13,14]. A four bit CR adder, for w=4, is shown 
in Figure 4.1. This adder is made of 8 XOR gates and 12 NAND gates, which is equivalent 
to 36 NOT gates (or equivalent gates [14]). Observe the longest path involves the carry 
chain through all the four full adders. The longest path passes by 2 XOR gates and 
6 NAND gates [14].  
In order to reduce the critical path in the hardware, a faster adder should be used. 
When delay optimization is requested to the synthesis tool, it uses a CLA adder. This adder 
is faster than the CR adder but uses more area. A four bit CLA adder is shown in 
Figure 4.2. It is constructed of: 4 NAND, 4 XOR, 5 NOT, 7 NOR and 14 AND gates, 
which is equivalent to 56 NOT gates [14]. The longest path of this adder, however, passes 
through the following gates: NAND, AND, NOR and XOR, as shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.1 The carry-ripple adder 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 A four bit carry-look-ahead adder 
 
 
4.3 Area & Delay Comparison  
 
The four bits CR adders area is equivalent to 36 gates while the CLA adder is 
equivalent to 56 gates, which corresponds to 55.5% area increase. On the other hand, the 
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delay of the CR adder is through 2 XOR and 6 NAND gates while its through a NAND, 
AND, NOR, and XOR gates for the CLA adder, which is shorter (the delay of an XOR 
gate is much more than AND, OR, and NAND) [14]. When the adders are used in the 
design, the speed and area impact on the complete hardware differs, because of the speed 
and area contributions of the other system components. A study of the impact of different 
optimizations (changing the adders) on the synthesis of the AlmMonInv scalable design is 
listed in Table 4.1. The results of the same experimentation performed on the AlmMonInv 
fixed precision hardware is shown in Table 4.2. 
 
 
Area Optimization Delay Optimization  
nmax 
(bits) 
 
w 
(bits) 
Period 
(nsec) 
Area 
(gates) 
Period 
(nsec) 
Area 
(gates) 
Area 
loss 
Percentage 
Delay 
Improvement 
Percentage 
128 4 9.62 9032 9.5 10364 14.75 % 1.20 % 
128 8 12.39 9313 10.74 10568 13.47 % 13.3 % 
128 16 19.48 9887 15.4 11357 14.87 % 21.0 % 
128 32 30.66 11177 25.72 13148 17.63 % 16.1 % 
128 64 54.93 13602 43.91 17028 25.19 % 20.0 % 
128 128 102. 2 24453 79.53 31112 27.23 % 22.1 % 
256 4 9.62 15346 9.5 17610 14.75 % 1.20 % 
256 8 12.39 15627 10.74 17814 14.02 % 13.3 % 
256 16 19.48 16201 15.4 18603 14.83 % 21.0 % 
256 32 30.66 17491 25.72 20394 16.61 % 16.1 % 
256 64 54.93 19916 43.91 24274 21.89 % 20.0 % 
256 128 102. 2 30767 79.53 38358 24.67 % 22.1 % 
512 4 9.62 27804 9.5 31906 14.75 % 1.20 % 
512 8 12.39 28085 10.74 32110 14.33 % 13.3 % 
512 16 19.48 28659 15.4 32899 14.8 % 21.0 % 
512 32 30.66 29949 25.72 34690 15.83 % 16.1 % 
512 64 54.93 32374 43.91 38570 19.14 % 20.0 % 
512 128 102. 2 43225 79.53 52654 21.81 % 22.1 % 
 
Table 4.1 Area and delay optimizations of the AlmMonInv scalable design 
 
 
Consider Table 4.1 of the scalable design, the average area loss percentage is 
calculated to be 17.81%, which gains in the delay an average of 15.62%. Whereas, from 
Table 4.2, the fixed precision designs average area loss is calculated to be 21.23% to raise 
the average speed by 5.5%. This study clearly shows that changing the adders to fast ones 
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benefits the scalable hardware in a much better way than the fixed precision one. The extra 
area needed to reduce the clock cycle period is much less for the scalable hardware than it 
is for the fixed precision design.  
 
 
Area Optimization Delay Optimization  
nmax 
(bits) 
Period 
(nsec) 
Area 
(gates) 
Period 
(nsec) 
Area 
(gates) 
Area 
loss 
Percentage 
Delay 
improvement 
Percentage 
4 11.41 796 11 925 16.20 % 3.59 % 
8 15.96 1501 15 1817 21.05 % 6.01 % 
16 26.5 2911 26 3576 22.84 % 1.88 % 
32 48 6395 47 7496 17.21 % 2.08 % 
64 92 12672 89 14944 17.92 % 3.26 % 
128 178 23952 165 29001 21.07 % 7.30 % 
256 350 46512 317 57010 22.57 % 9.42 % 
512 694 69327 621 90907 31.12 % 10.5 % 
 
Table 4.2 Area and delay optimizations of the AlmMonInv fixed precision design 
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5 A SCALABLE HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE FOR MONTGOMERY 
INVERSION IN GF(p) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The starting point for the research of a complete Montgomery modular inverse 
hardware implementation is presented in [1]. The algorithm in [1] requires two main 
operations and in this Chapter we suggest replacing one of them by a simpler operation. A 
further modification to the inversion algorithm to use multi-bit shifting instead of single-bit 
shifting is also proposed. These two improvements reduce the number of clock cycles 
without significantly increasing the clock period, which results in an overall speedup of the 
inverse computation.  
The improved algorithm is mapped to hardware when the scalability feature presented 
in Chapter 3 is also incorporated. In this hardware design, the long-precision numbers are 
divided into words and each word is processed in a clock cycle. It is shown that this 
hardware is appropriate for cryptographic applications. This work shows the area and 
speed of several scalable hardware configurations compared with a fixed precision design 
presented in [27]. 
Section 5.2 presents the Montgomery inverse algorithm including the new correction 
phase proposed in this work. Section 5.3 explains the multi-bit shifting strategy and 
corresponding modifications to the hardware algorithm. In Section 5.4 the scalable 
hardware design is described in some detail. The comparison between different hardware 
configurations is given in Section 5.5.  
 
 
5.2 Montgomery Inverse Algorithm and Proposed Modifications 
 
 
5.2.1 New Approaches for Montgomery Inverse 
 
Lets consider the main Montgomery inverse problem again (introduced before in 
Section 3.2). An approach to calculate x=a-12nmod p from a2n can be to compute a first and 
 46
then calculate the AlmMonInv (Kaliski Phase one (Section 3.2.1)) followed by Kaliski 
Phase two to get the desired inverse result. The first computation of a from a2n is 
performed by a modular division by 2n named Preparation Phase as shown below.  
 
Preparation Phase (Divide by 2n) 
Input:  r = a2n, n & p; where p=modulus & 2n-1 ≤ p < 2n 
Output:  x; where x = a mod p  
1. for i = 1 to n do 
2.  if r is even then r = r/2 
3.  else r = (r + p)/2 
4. return x = r 
 
Note that calculating a from a2n may be also obtained by a Montgomery multiplication [1] 
as follows: 
MonPro(a2n,1) = a2n (2-n) mod p= a mod p. 
 
However, the preparation phase is preferred in our case instead of MonPro, since it clearly 
can be implemented using the same hardware components of the AlmMonInv already 
proposed in Section 3.4.  
Another new way to calculate the Montgomery inverse is by applying the AlmMonInv 
on the input a2n to produce r and k according to the formula:   
(r,k) = AlmMonInv (a2n) 
where 
r = (a2n)-12k mod p = a-12k-n mod p 
Recall that Montgomery inverse of a2n is a-12nmod p, which implies that the AlmMonInv 
result (a-12k-nmod p) must be corrected. It is possible to find a constant C such that:  
C × (a-12k-n mod p) = a-12nmod p. 
Applying some algebra we get:  
C=(a-12nmod p)/(a-12k-nmod p)=(a-12n)/(a-12k-n)=(2n)/(2k-n)=2n-(k-n)=22n-k 
The modular multiplication of (a-12k-nmod p) by (22n-k) can be performed as follows:  
([((((a-12k-n).2).2).2)..2).2)] mod p) = a-12nmod p 
 
2n-k times    
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This arrangement of applying the modular operation after completing the multiplication is 
very expensive because the result of the multiplication by 22n-k may be much greater than 
the modulus and a large amount of hardware will be required to handle it [11]. However, 
the operation can be simplified by introducing the modular reduction after each 
multiplication by 2 as the following: 
[(((((a-12k-n).2) mod p).2)  2) mod p).2) mod p)]=a-12nmod p 
The modular reduction operation is performed by a subtraction of p whenever the number 
exceeds p. The proposed correction phase consists then in performing a multiplication of  
a-12k-n by C = 22n-k as outlined below: 
 
Correction Phase (Multiply by 22n-k) 
Input:    r, p, n & k; where r & k are AlmMonInv outputs 
Output: x; where x = a-12n mod p  
1. for i = 2n-k to 0 do 
2.  r = 2r 
3.  if r > p then r= (r  p) 
4. return x = r 
 
 
5.2.2 Evaluation of Alternatives 
 
Several methods considered for hardware computation of the Montgomery inverse are 
shown in Figure 5.1; including the procedures proposed by Savas and Koç in [1] using 
MonPro. Each path in the graph has its own set of routines and its total computation time. 
Figure 5.1 presents the approximate number of iterations for each routine. Note that the 
number of iterations for multiplication is estimated considering serial-parallel multipliers, 
because fully parallel multipliers are extremely large [6]. 
All approaches of Figure 5.1 lead to the same final result. However, the number of 
iterations in each path proves that our two-phase method, the AlmMonInv followed by the 
correction phase (path: 1-4-6), is the fastest. It requires only 2n iterations to complete the 
inversion as shown in Table 5.1, the AlmMonInv needs 1.5n iterations, and the correction 
phase (CorPh) needs 0.5n iterations, assuming an average value of k=1.5n [1]. 
Observe that the other approach proposed in Section 5.2.1 (path: 1-2-3-6) would 
require 3n iterations in average to complete the inversion (Table 5.1); it is a slow 
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alternative and for this reason will not receive further attention. For the previously 
proposed methods using MonPro multipliers (path: 1-4-3-6 or 1-4-5-6) [1], even if the 
multipliers are completely parallel (one iteration instead of n), they need more than 2n 
iterations, which is still slower than using the path 1-4-6. The proposed method is the only 
two-phase method in the graph (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Different ways to compute the Montgomery inversion 
 
 
 MonInv computation path Delay (number of iterations) 
 1-4-3-6 1.5n+n+0.5n = 3n 
New 1-2-3-6 n+1.5n+0.5n = 3n 
 1-4-5-6 1.5n+0.5n+n = 3n 
New 1-4-6 1.5n +0.5n     = 2n 
 
Table 5.1 Delay of different ways to compute the Montgomery inverse 
 
 
5.3 Multi-Bit Shifting 
 
The AlmMonInv algorithm needs to finish its computation completely before the 
CorPh algorithm begins processing. This data dependency allows the use of the same 
hardware to execute both algorithms, i.e., both the AlmMonInv and CorPh. The following 
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sections present an improvement of the AlmMonInv and CorPh algorithms based on a 
multi-bit shifting method. 
 
 
5.3.1 AlmMonInv Hardware Algorithm 
 
The AlmMonInv algorithm, when observed from hardware point-of-view, contains 
operations that are easily mapped to hardware as described in Section 3.3.1, which also 
provides the fixed precision hardware AlmMonInv algorithm (FHW-Alg) used in this 
section. Observe step 10 of the AlmMonInv algorithm (Section 3.2.1), the result of r=p 
occurs if-and-only-if a=∞, which cannot happen since a∈[1,p-1]. Thus, the result of 
AlmMonInv algorithm equals either 2p-r when r>p, or p-r when r<p (as described in step 
10 of the FHW-Alg). 
 
 
5.3.2 Best Maximum Distance for Multi-bit Shifter 
 
Consider the FHW-Alg (Section 3.3.1). The operation to shift numbers u and s (step 
2), or v and r (step 3), are performed depending on u0 and v0. In fact, when u0 or v0 is zero, 
only shift operation happens. Suppose that the four least significant (LS) bits of u are zeros. 
The shifting process on u will consume four iterations to be completed.  
The multi-bit shifting method can be applied to shift two, three, four, five or more bits 
depending on the number of continuous zeros found at the LS bit positions of u and v. 
However, this number of zeros depends on data that are modified during the process. Thus 
a probabilistic analysis of the bit vectors u and v will give us an idea about maximum 
number of bits to be shifted.  
Let p be the probability of a bit to be zero and q=(1-p) be the probability of being one. 
The probability function PF used to calculate the probability of having x consecutive LS 
bits of u or v as zeros is: PF(x) = qpx; where x is the number of LS zeros [26]. Note that as 
x gets larger PF(x) reduces tremendously. The PF(x) values show that multi-bit shifting 
should be investigated only for x<6 bits. 
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In the FHW-Alg presented in Section 3.3.1, the loop (steps 2 through 8) is executed 
for k iterations. Based on experimental statistics collected with a software implementation 
of the AlmMonInv algorithm, nearly half of the k algorithm iterations are used executing 
step 4 (addition and subtraction) and the other half executing only steps 2 or 3 (shifting 
process) [1]. Applying the multi-bit shifting approach will reduce the number of iterations 
for the shifting process only. Reusing p=0.5 as the probability of performing a shift 
operation, we estimate the average number of iterations based on a probabilistic model. 
Table 5.2 shows probabilistic equations to compute the number of iterations when a multi-
bit shifter of up to x bits is available. The first polynomial term (as clarified in Figure 5.2 
for the case of x=3) stands for the number of iterations used for addition and subtraction 
(step 4 of FHW-Alg). This term is not affected at all by x (the maximum number of bits to 
be shifted). The following terms consider the use of multi-bit shifting. The total number of 
iterations (k) will be affected according to the number of bits shifted. Given the value p that 
was defined before, the average number of iterations (i) is computed as listed in the last 
column of Table 5.2. 
 
 
x  Probabilistic Equations i  
1 (1-p)k + pk 1.00 k 
2 (1-p)k + p[(1-p)k + p k/2] 0.88 k 
3 (1-p)k + p[(1-p)k + p((1-p) k/2 + p k/3)] 0.85 k 
4 (1-p)k + p[(1-p)k + p((1-p) k/2 + p [(1-p) k/3 + p k/4])] 0.849 k 
5 (1-p)k + p[(1-p)k +p((1-p) k/2+p[(1-p)k/3+p((1-p)k/4+pk/5)])] 0.847 k 
 
Table 5.2 Average number of iterations (i) 
 
 
After comparing the different i values, the notable improvement is found for the case 
with x=3 (shifting up to three bits), which gives the average of 15% reduction in the 
number of iterations (k). Note that there is not a significant improvement when x>3. 
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Figure 5.2 Description of i for the case of x = 3 
 
 
5.3.3 Adjustments to FHW-Alg 
 
The new capability to shift up to three bits requires a modification in the FHW-Alg, 
which is reflected in some units of the AlmMonInv hardware. The modified algorithm is 
shown below as the multi-bit shifting AlmMonInv hardware algorithm. 
 
Multi-Bit Shifting HW-Alg (MHW-Alg) 
Registers: u, v, r, s, & p (all five registers hold n bits) 
Input:  a ∈ [1, p -1], p = modulus.  
Output:  result∈[1, p -1] & k; where result=a-12kmod p & n≤k≤2n 
1.    u = p, v = a, r = 0, s = 1, k = 0 
2.    if(u2u1u0=000)then{u=ShiftR(u,3);s=ShiftL(s,3);k=k+3};goto 8 
2.1. if(u2u1u0=100)then{u=ShiftR(u,2);s=ShiftL(s,2);k=k+2};goto 8 
2.2. if(u2u1u0=110)then{u=ShiftR(u,1);s=ShiftL(s,1)};goto 7 
3.    if(v2v1v0=000)then{v=ShiftR(v,3);r=ShiftL(r,3);k=k+3};goto 8 
3.1. if(v2v1v0=100)then{v=ShiftR(v,2);r=ShiftL(r,2);k=k+2};goto 8 
3.2. if(v2v1v0=110)then{v=ShiftR(v,1);r=ShiftL(r,1)};goto 8 
4.    S1 = Subtract (u, v); S2 = Subtract (v, u); A1 = Add (r, s) 
5.    if(S1borrow=0)then{u=ShiftR(S1,1);r=A1;s=ShiftL(s,1)};goto 7 
6.    s = A1; v = ShiftR(S2,1); r = ShiftL(r,1)  
7.    k = k + 1 
8.    if (v ≠ 0) go to step 2 
9.    S1 = Subtract (p, r); S2 = Subtract (2p, r)  
10.  if(S1borrow=0)then{return result=S1}; else{return result = S2} 
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The MHW-Alg when implemented in hardware requires: two subtractors (used in 
steps 4 and 9), an adder (step 4), a k-counter (that variably increments up to three), two 
multi-bit shifters (to shift u and s or v and r up to three bits, steps 2 to 3.2), and five n-bit 
registers (to store all the variables: u, v, r, s and p). 
 
 
5.3.4 Suitable Multi-Bit Shifting the CorPh 
 
The CorPh algorithm contains operations that are easily mapped to hardware 
components as shown in the CorPh hardware algorithm (HW-Alg2) below: 
 
CorPh Hardware Algorithm (HW-Alg2) 
Registers:  r & p (two registers to hold n bits). 
Input:  r,p,n,k; where r (r= a-12k-nmod p)& k from AlmMonInv 
Output:  result; where result = a-12n (mod p). 
11. j= 2n-k-1 
12.  While j>0   
13.  r = ShiftL(r,1); j = j-1 
14.  S1 = Subtract(r, p) 
15.  if (S1borrow = 0) then {r = S1}  
16. return result = r 
 
To implement the HW-Alg2 in fixed precision hardware we need: two n-bit registers 
(to store r and p), a subtractor (step 14), a shifter, and a counter (step 13). The one-bit 
shifter (step 13) can be easily modified to perform multi-bit shifting and clearly reduce the 
number of iterations. The ideal situation is to implement HW-Alg2 utilizing the same 
MHW-Alg (Section 5.3.3) hardware components. Since the shift operation in the HW-Alg2 
is followed by a subtraction, applying the multi-bit shifting technique to the algorithm 
demands extra subtractors to perform these operations in parallel and fully speedup the 
process. The total number of iterations and the corresponding number of subtractors for 
some shifting distances are listed in Table 5.3. 
The practical choice of the maximum shifting distance in the CorPh implementation is 
two. This decision is due to the need of three subtractors when shifting two bits, which are 
already found in the AlmMonInv hardware (assuming twos complement subtraction). If 
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the maximum distance is three, seven subtractors are required, which is far beyond the 
AlmMonInv hardware capability. To clarify this issue and how Table 5.3 is generated, let 
us start by assuming single-bit shifting. Observe that r<p, and 2r cannot reach 2p, at most 
one subtraction will be needed when 2r>p. When the distance is two, we need to shift r 
two bits to obtain 4r, where 4r<4p. This time, 4r must be reduced by subtractions of 3p, 
2p, or p if necessary. The CorPh algorithm is modified to accommodate the two-bit shifting 
as shown in the multi-bit shifting CorPh hardware algorithm below (MHW-Alg2). 
 
Multi-Bit Shifting HW-Alg2 (MHW-Alg2) 
Registers: r, u, v & p (all four registers are to hold n bits). 
Input:  r,p,n,k; where r (r=a-12k-nmod p)&k from AlmMonInv 
Output: result; where result = a-12n (mod p). 
11. j = 2n-k-1 
12.  v = 2p; u = 3p  
13. While j > 0  
14.  if j =1 then {r = ShiftL(r,1); j=j-1}  
15.  else {r = ShiftL(r,2); j=j-2} 
16.  S1=Subtract(r,p);S2=Subtract(r,v);S3=Subtract(r,u)  
17.  if (S3borrow = 0) then  {r = S3}  
18.  else if (S2borrow = 0) then {r = S2} 
19.  else if (S1borrow = 0) then  {r = S1} 
20. return result = r 
 
 
 
Number of bits to be 
shifted per iteration 
CorPh hardware 
number of subtractors 
CorPh execution number 
of iterations 
1 1 (2n-k) 
2 3 (2n-k)/2 
3 7 (2n-k)/3 
4 15 (2n-k)/4 
 
Table 5.3 Speed and hardware changes due to multi-bit shifting the CorPh algorithm 
 
 
The three subtraction operations are performed in parallel, as step 16 of MHW-Alg2. 
Four registers are needed to hold the variables r, u, v and p. The value of p is already 
available in register p, however, the values of 2p and 3p have to be computed once at the 
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beginning of the CorPh and stored in registers v and u respectively (step 12). The counter, 
j, is set to 2n-k-1 at step 11 (using the value k from AlmMonInv); it is used to keep track of 
the number of iterations in the algorithm. 
 
 
5.4 The Scalable Design 
 
 
5.4.1 Scalable Hardware Issues Applied to the Algorithms 
 
Differently from what normally happens in the full-precision hardware design, the 
scalable hardware, as in [27], has multi-precision operators for shifting, addition, 
subtraction and comparison. Consider the MHW-Alg shown in Section 5.3.3, for example, 
the subtraction used for comparison (u>v) is performed on a word-by-word (w-bit slices) 
basis until all the data words (all n bits) are processed, as outlined below: 
 
for i = 1 to n/w 
(xborrow , xiw-1 : iw-w) = Subtract (uiw-1 : iw-w , viw-1 : iw-w , xborrow) 
(yborrow , yiw-1 : iw-w) = Subtract (viw-1 : iw-w , uiw-1 : iw-w , yborrow)  
(zcarry , ziw-1 : iw-w) = Add (riw-1 : iw-w , siw-1 : iw-w , zcarry) 
 
Then, the final word borrow out bit is used to decide on the result. Also, depending on the 
subtraction completion, variable r or s has to be shifted. All variables, u, v, r and s, cannot 
change until the subtraction processes complete, and the borrow-out bit appears. This 
forces the use of three more variables: x, y and z; where x=u-v, y=v-u and z=r+s. These 
variables are stored in extra registers increasing the number of hardware registers to eight. 
All the registers hold nmax bits even though the actual number of bits in the numbers are 
n≤nmax bits. This nmax limit defines the memory capability and does not degrade the total 
computation time of the inversion process; i.e., the total delay of the computation depends 
on the actual number of bits (n) and not on nmax. 
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5.4.2 Scalable Hardware Design 
 
The scalable hardware design is built of two main parts, a memory unit and a 
computing unit, as shown in Figure 5.3. It is very similar, in principle, to the scalable 
hardware presented in [27]. The memory unit is not scalable because it has a limited 
storage defined by the value of nmax. The data values of a and p are first loaded in the 
memory unit. Then, the computing unit read/write (modify) the data using a word size of w 
bits. The computing unit is completely scalable. It is designed to handle w bits every clock 
cycle. The computing unit does not know the total number of bits, nmax, the memory is 
holding. It computes until the controller indicates that all operands words were processed. 
Note that the actual numbers used may be way smaller than nmax bits. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Montgomery inverse scalable hardware block diagram 
 
 
The memory unit contains a counter to compute variable k and eight first-in-first-out 
(FIFO) registers used to store the inversion algorithms variables. All registers, u, v, r, s, x, 
y, z and p, are limited to hold at most nmax bits. Each FIFO register has its own reset signal 
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generated by the controller. They have counters to keep track of n (the number of bits 
actually used by the application). 
The computing unit is made of four hardware blocks, the add/subtract, shifter, data 
router, and controller block. The add/subtract unit is built of two subtractors, an 
adder/subtractor, four flip-flops, one multiplexer, a comparator, and logic gates, connected 
as shown in Figure 5.4. This unit performs one of two operations, either two subtractions 
and one addition for the MHW-Alg (Section 5.3.3), or three subtractions for the MHW-
Alg2 (Section 5.3.4). To execute MHW-Alg the Adder/Subtractor3 is controlled to work as 
an adder (step 4 of MHW-Alg). The same Adder/Subtractor3 is used as subtractor to 
execute step 16 of the MHW-Alg2. Three flip-flops are used to hold the intermediate 
borrow-bits of the subtractors and the carry-bit of the adder to implement the multi-
precision operations. The fourth flip-flop is used to store a flag that keeps track of the 
comparison between u and v, which is used to perform step 8 of MHW-Alg. The borrow-
out bits from the subtractors are connected to the controller used only at the end of the each 
multi-precision addition/subtraction operation. Subtractor 1 borrow-out bit is used to test 
the condition in step 5 of MHW-Alg. It is also essential in electing the result observed in 
step 10 of MHW-Alg. The three subtractors borrow-out bits (S1borrow, S2borrow, S3borrow) are 
likewise necessary to select the correct if condition to be used in steps 17, 18, or 19, of 
the MHW-Alg2 algorithm. 
The multi-bit shifter is made of two multiplexers and two registers with special 
mapping of some data bits, as shown in Figure 5.5. The two multiplexers are used to select 
the correct set to be used in the multi-bit shifter. Depending on the controller signal 
Distance, the shifter acts as a one, two, or three-bit shifter. Two types of shifting are 
needed in the MHW-Alg algorithm, right shifting an operand (u or v) through the uv bus 
(one, two, or three bits) and left shifting another operand (r or s) through the rs bus (by 
similar number of bits). Right shifting u or v is performed through Register1, which is of 
size w-1 bits. For each word, w-1 bits of uv are stored in Register1. The LS bit(s) of each 
word is (are) read out immediately as the most significant bit(s) of the output bus uv_out. 
Left shifting r or s is performed via Register2, which is of size w+3 bits, in a similar 
fashion. When executing the MHW-Alg2, the left shifting is performed to a distance of 
either one or two bits using the rs path only. 
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Figure 5.4 Add/subtract unit 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Multi-bit shifter (max distance = 3) 
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The data router shown in the complete hardware (Figure 5.3) is made of twelve 
multiplexers to connect the data going out of the memory unit to the inputs of the 
add/subtract unit or shifter and also transfers the shifted data values to their destination 
locations in the memory unit. The possible configurations of the data router are shown in 
Figure 5.6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Data router configurations 
 
 
The controller is the unit that coordinates the flow of data. It consists in a state 
machine easily derived from both MHW-Alg and MHW-Alg2. The controller does not 
include counters to avoid any dependency on the number of bits (nmax) that the system can 
handle. Such counters are located in the memory block, which is the non-scalable 
component in the system. 
 
 
5.5 Modeling and Analysis 
 
The proposed Montgomery inverse scalable design was modeled and simulated in 
VHDL similar to Section 3.5. It has two main parameters, namely nmax and w, which define 
several hardware configurations. These design configurations are compared in this work 
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with other fixed precision designs previously described in [27] only parameterized by nmax 
because w=nmax in their case. 
For both area and speed comparisons, we show the fixed precision design in [27] 
modified to execute both MHW-Alg and MHW-Alg2, to be realistic and functionally 
similar to the scalable hardware of this work. Note that the area presented in [27] is the 
same given here because modifying the AlmMonInv hardware to process both AlmMonInv 
and CorPh will increase the area with a negligible amount due to modification in the 
controller. However, the time of [27] is different than what is here since it considers the 
execution of the complete Montgomery inverse computation. We didnt define a specific 
architecture for the adders and subtractors used in the designs. Thus, the synthesis tool 
chooses the best option from its library of standard cells.  
 
 
5.5.1 Area Comparison 
 
The area of the scalable designs and the fixed precision one are compared in       
Figure 5.7. As nmax increases the difference between the fixed precision hardware and 
scalable ones increases, which is expected because of the increasing burden of the 
computing unit of the fixed precision design. Observe that the fixed precision design has 
larger area than all scalable ones except for the configuration with w=128 and nmax<160 
bits. As w approaches nmax, the scalable designs benefit reduces and the extra hardware 
used for multi-precision computation shows up. In other words, the scalable design with 
w=nmax has the same size of adder and subtractors as the fixed one with extra hardware for 
scalability features, making it more expensive. 
 
 
5.5.2 Speed Comparison 
 
The total computation time is the product of the number of clock cycles the algorithm 
takes and the clock period of the final implementation. This clock period changes with the 
value of w in the scalable hardware (Table 5.4), and changes with the value of nmax in the 
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fixed precision hardware (Table 5.5). Tables 5.4 and 5.5 lists the clock period for each 
design obtained from synthesis of the VHDL models. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Area comparison 
 
 
w   4 8 16 32 64 128 
Period 12 14 19 28 47 82 
 
Table 5.4 Clock cycle period for scalable designs (nsec) 
 
 
nmax 32 64 128 256 512 1024 
Period 50 93 178 351 694 1382 
 
Table 5.5 Clock cycle period for fixed designs (nsec) 
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The number of clock cycles for all designs depends completely on the data and its 
computation. For the scalable design, the number of cycles is a function of three 
parameters: k, w and n. To compute any shifting, addition and/or subtraction, the number 
of cycles is calculated as n/w. The total number of clock cycles to execute step 2 or 3 is 
different than step 4. Step 4 needs extra n/w cycles for the shifting operation after it 
(steps 5 or 6). The average number of clock cycles to perform each iteration of MHW-Alg 
(step 2 through step 8) is calculated as  
CPI1=(0.5n/w)+(0.5(2×n/w), 
(CPI stands for the clock cycles per iteration within the loop: step 2 to 8). The number of 
iterations of FHW-Alg is originally equal to k, but applying the multi-bit shifting of section 
5.3.2, the average number of iterations reduces to 0.85k. An extra n/w cycles are needed 
once after ending the loop of MHW-Alg (Section 5.3.3) to perform steps 9 and 10. The 
overall average number of cycles to execute MHW-Alg equals  
(CPI1×0.85k)+n/w. 
Similarly, the average number of clock cycles of the scalable hardware to execute 
MHW-Alg2 (Section 5.3.4) equals to  
CPI2×(2n-k)/2; 
where CPI2=2×n/w and (2n-k)/2 is the average number of iterations when shifting two 
bits per iteration, as explained in section 5.3.4. The value of k (MHW-Alg and MHW-
Alg2) is within the range [n,2n] [1], which justify the use of its average of 3n/2, for 
comparison purposes. The total number of clock cycles required by the scalable design to 
complete Montgomery inverse computation is then calculated as 
Cs=(2.4125n+1)n/w, 
which was verified by several VHDL simulations. 
For the fixed precision design to perform the CorPh after the AlmMonInv both using 
multi-bit shifting algorithms as MHW-Alg and MHW-Alg2, the total average number of 
clock cycles is n+0.35k; where 0.85*k cycles are used to execute MHW-Alg, and (2n-k)/2 
cycles are allocated for MHW-Alg2. If k is approximated to its average of 3n/2 (similar to 
the scalable design), the number of the clock cycles will be given by the function 
Cf=1.525n. 
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Several scalable hardware configurations are designed depending on different nmax and 
w parameters. Each configuration can have different computation time depending on the 
actual number of bits, n, used. For example, Figure 5.8 shows the delay of six scalable 
hardware designs compared to the fixed precision hardware, all modeled for nmax=512 bits, 
which is a practical number for future ECC applications [11]. Observe how the actual data 
size (n) plays a big role on the speed of the designs. In other words, as n reduces and w is 
small, the number of clock cycles decrease significantly, which considerably reduces the 
overall computing time of the scalable design compared to the fixed precision one. This is 
a major advantage of the scalable hardware. 
Recall that the number of clock cycles of all designs depends on the actual size of the 
data used and the actual data value. However, the fixed precision hardware clock period is 
always assumed to have nmax bits to process. i.e., if the application needs only n=128 bits, 
and all designs are made for nmax=512 bits, as the example of Figure 5.8, the fixed 
precision design clock frequency is not affected by n and all nmax bits are treated in the 
computation causing the fixed precision design to have a total time greater than all 
configurations of the scalable designs. This observation was found valid for other nmax 
values (designs for these cases we actually tested and synthesized). It was observed that all 
scalable designs are faster than the fixed precision one while 
 
 
In Figure 5.8, for example, as n<nmax/2 (n=256) the fixed precision hardware is faster than 
the scalable one with w=4 bits and very similar to the design with w=8 bits. As n>3nmax/4 
(n=384) the scalable design with w=16 has a speed that falls below the fixed precision one. 
When n=nmax=512 the scalable design with w=32 bits has almost the same speed as the 
fixed precision one, but the ones with w>nmax/16 bits remain faster. In fact, as w gets 
bigger, the total time decreases, which is also true when comparing among the different 
scalable designs as long as n≥w (Figure 5.8). Whenever n<w, considering the scalable 
designs only, the advantage of the scalable designs reduces indicating that the number of 
words to be processed reached its lower limit, but still the scalable designs are faster than 
the fixed precision one. 
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Figure 5.8 Delay comparison of designs with nmax = 512 bits 
 
 
The previous speed comparison results depend on Leonardos clock periods 
(technology dependent). If we use the technology independent method discussed in Section 
3.5.2.2, the speed comparison is as shown in Figure 5.9. Note that all scalable hardware 
designs are faster than the fixed precision designs while: 
n < nmax / 1.5 
Another observation from Figure 5.9 is that the scalable design configurations speeds 
converge (tending to be very similar) when: 
n > w. 
This gives the general impression of disagreement with Leonardos speed comparison 
results (Figure 5.8), which is due to the technology independent assumption            
(Section 3.5.2.2) of considering the longest path of the designs only by the adders. 
Although the adders dominate the longest paths of the designs, other components 
(controller and data router) affects too.  
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Figure 5.9 Technology independent speed comparison for all designs with nmax=512 bits 
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6 SCALABLE AND UNIFIED HARDWARE TO COMPUTE MONTGOMERY 
INVERSE IN GF(p) AND GF(2n) 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Cryptographic inverse calculations are normally defined over either prime or binary 
extension fields [11], more specifically Galois Fields GF(p) or GF(2n). All available 
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) implementations for inversion computation 
[16-18,20-25] are created strictly for one finite field, either GF(p) or GF(2n). If the 
hardware at hand is for GF(2n) calculations, such as [17,18,20-25], and the application 
needs GF(p) computation, a completely different hardware is required [11]. It is inefficient 
to have two hardware designs (one for GF(p) and another for GF(2n)) when only one is 
needed each time. This issue motivated the search for a single unified hardware 
architecture used to compute inversion in either finite field GF(p) or GF(2n), similar, in 
principle, to the multiplier idea proposed in [7]. 
The GF(p) Montgomery inverse (MonInv) algorithm (presented in Chapter 5) is an 
efficient method for doing inversion with an odd modulus. The algorithm is particularly 
suitable for implementation on application specific integrated circuits (ASICs). For GF(2n) 
inversion, the original inverse procedure (presented in [37]) has been extended to the finite 
field GF(2n) in [35]. It replaces the modulus (p) by an irreducible polynomial (p(x)), and 
adjusts the algorithm according to the properties of polynomials. We implemented the 
inversion algorithms in hardware based on the observation that the Montgomery inverse 
algorithm for both fields GF(p) and GF(2n) can be very similar. We show that a unified 
architecture computing the Montgomery inversion in the fields GF(p) and GF(2n) is 
designed at a price only slightly higher than the one for only the filed GF(p), providing 
major savings when having both types of inverters is desirable or required. 
A scalable Montgomery inverter design methodology for GF(p) was introduced in 
Chapters 3 and 5. This methodology allows the use of a fixed-area Montgomery inverter 
ASIC design to perform the inversion of unlimited precision operands. The design 
tradeoffs for best performance in a limited chip area were also analyzed in Section 5.5. We 
use the design approach as in [27] to obtain a scalable hardware module. Furthermore, the 
scalable inverter described in this Chapter is capable of performing inversion in both finite 
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fields GF(p) and GF(2n) and is for this reason called a scalable and unified Montgomery 
inverter. 
There are two main contributions of this Chapter. First, we show that a unified 
architecture for inversion can be easily designed without compromising scalability and 
without significantly affecting delay and area. Second, we investigate the effect of word 
length (w) and the actual number of bits (n) on the hardware area, based on actual 
implementation results obtained by synthesis tools. In Section 6.2, we propose the GF(2n) 
extended Montgomery inverse procedure that has several features suitable for an efficient 
hardware implementation. The unified architecture and its operation in both types of finite 
fields, GF(p) and GF(2n), are described in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents the area/time 
tradeoffs and appropriate choices for the word lengths of the scalable module. Finally, a 
summary is discussed in Section 6.5. 
 
 
6.2 Montgomery Inverse Hardware Procedures For GF(p) and GF(2n) 
 
In order to design a unified Montgomery inverse architecture, the GF(p) and GF(2n) 
algorithms need to be very similar and this way consume the least amount of extra 
hardware. Extending the GF(p) Montgomery inverse algorithm to GF(2n) is practical due to 
the removal of carry propagation required in the addition of GF(p) element and simple 
adjustments of test conditions. In other words, the GF(2n) algorithm is like a simplification 
of the GF(p) one. The converse (modifying GF(2n) algorithms for GF(p)), on the other 
hand, is very difficult [7,11,35,36]. 
As explained before (Section 5.2), the scalable GF(p) Montgomery inverse (MonInv) 
procedure proposed in this work consists in two phases: the almost Montgomery inverse 
(AlmMonInv) and the correction phase (CorPh). Both GF(p) AlmMonInv and CorPh 
algorithms were mapped to hardware features and further modified for multi-bit shifting, a 
concept discussed in Section 5.3, which resulted in an efficient implementation of the 
GF(p) Montgomery inverse. The GF(p) multi-bit shifting for both AlmMonInv and CorPh 
hardware algorithms (MHW-Alg and MHW-Alg2, respectively), are outlined in Figure 6.1. 
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MHW-Alg: GF(p) Multi-Bit Shifting AlmMonInv 
Hardware Algorithm 
Registers: u, v, r, s, x, y, z, and p (all registers hold nmax bits) 
Input:       a2m∈[1, p-1]; Where p = modulus, and m≥n (2n-1≤p≤2n) 
Output:  result∈[1, p-1] & k;  
                                             Where result=a-12k-mmod p & n<k<2n 
1.    u = p; v = a2m; r = 0; s = 1; x = 0; y = 0; z = 0; k = 0 
2.    if(u2u1u0=000)then{u=ShiftR(u,3);s=ShiftL(s,3);k=k+3};goto 8 
2.1. if(u2u1u0=100)then{u=ShiftR(u,2);s=ShiftL(s,2);k=k+2};goto 8 
2.2. if(u2u1u0=110)then{u=ShiftR(u,1);s=ShiftL(s,1)};goto 7 
3.    if(v2v1v0=000)then{v=ShiftR(v,3);r=ShiftL(r,3);k=k+3};goto 8 
3.1. if(v2v1v0=100)then{v=ShiftR(v,2);r=ShiftL(r,2);k=k+2};goto 8 
3.2. if(v2v1v0=110)then{v=ShiftR(v,1);r=ShiftL(r,1)};goto 8 
4.    x = Subtract (u, v); y = Subtract (v, u); z = Add (r, s) 
5.    if(xborrow=0)then{u=ShiftR(x,1); r=z; s=ShiftL(s,1)};goto 7 
6.    s = z; v = ShiftR(y,1); r = ShiftL(r,1) 
7.    k = k + 1 
8.    if (v ≠ 0) go to step 2 
9.    x = Subtract (p, r); y = Subtract (2p, r) 
10.  if(xborrow = 0)then{result=x}; else{ result = y} 
MHW-Alg2:GF(p) Multi-Bit Shifting CorPh 
Hardware Algorithm 
Registers: r, u, v, x, y, z, and p (all registers hold nmax bits) 
Input:       r, p, n, k;  
                        Where r (r=a-12k-mmod p)&k from MHW-Alg 
Output:    result; Where result = a-12m (mod p). 
11.       j = 2m-k; x = 0; y = 0; z = 0 
12.      v = 2p; u = 3p 
13.      While j > 0 
14.           if j =1 then {r = ShiftL(r,1); j=j-1} 
15.           else {r = ShiftL(r,2); j=j-2} 
16.           x=Subtract(r,p);y=Subtract(r,v);z=Subtract(r,u) 
17.           if (zborrow = 0) then  {r = z} 
18.           else if (yborrow = 0) then {r = y} 
19.           else if (xborrow = 0) then  {r = x} 
20.      result = r 
 
Figure 6.1 Montgomery inverse hardware algorithm for GF(p) 
 
 
Differently from what normally happens in a full-precision hardware design, the 
scalable hardware, as in [6-8,27], has multi-precision operators for shifting, addition, 
subtraction and comparison. Observe the AlmMonInv algorithm in Figure 6.1, for 
example, the scalable subtraction (step 4) is also used for comparison (u>v), which is 
performed on a word-by-word (w-bit words) basis until all the actual data words (all n bits) 
are processed. Then, the final word borrow out bit is used to decide on the result. Also, 
depending on the subtraction completion, variable r or s has to be shifted. All variables, u, 
v, r and s, need to remain as is until the subtraction process is complete, and the borrow out 
bit appears. For this reason, eight registers are required, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
6.2.1 Representation and Manipulation of Elements in GF(2n) 
 
The inversion algorithm for GF(2n) considered in this work was presented in [35]. 
Although prime and binary extension fields, GF(p) and GF(2n), have different properties, 
the elements of either field are represented using similar data structures. The elements of 
the field GF(2n) can be represented in several different ways [11]. The polynomial 
representation, however, is a useful and appropriate form to the unified implementation, as 
used for the unified multiplier in [7]. According to the GF(2n) polynomial representation, 
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an element a(x) in GF(2n) is a polynomial of length n, i.e., of degree less than or equal to    
n-1, written as  
a(x)=an-1xn-1+an-2xn-2+ ... +a2x2+a1x+a0,  
where ai is an element in GF(2). These coefficients ai are represented as bits in the 
computer and the element a(x) is represented as a bit vector a=(an-1 an-2 ... a2 a1 a0). 
The addition/subtraction of two elements a(x) and b(x) in GF(2n) is performed by 
adding/subtracting the polynomials a(x) and b(x), where the coefficients are 
added/subtracted in the field GF(2). As a consequence, both addition and subtraction 
operations are exactly the same and equivalent to bit-wise XOR operations on the bit 
vectors a and b (ai ⊕ bi). In order to compute the inverse of element a(x) in GF(2n), we 
need an irreducible polynomial of degree n. Let the irreducible polynomial be       
p(x)=xn+pn-1xn-1+pn-2xn-2+ ... +p2x2+p1x+p0 [11]. 
where pi is an element in GF(2). Whenever a polynomial degree, in the intermediate 
inversion calculations, equals n, the polynomial should be reduced (XORed) by p(x). Lets 
use the notation ||p(x)|| to represent the degree of a polynomial p(x). If, for example, ||r(x)|| 
= ||p(x)|| then r is replaced by p⊕r. Note that in some cases ||r(x)|| = ||p(x)|| while r < p 
(recall that r is the binary representation of r(x) as it is p for p(x)). These cases restrict the 
comparison of r to 2n to indicate if r(x) needs to be reduced by p(x) (r=p⊕r), which means 
that r(x) is compared with xn (represented by 2n) and not p(x). 
 
 
6.2.2 Montgomery Inverse in GF(2n) 
 
The GF(2n) Montgomery inverse of a(x)xmmod p(x) is a(x)-1xmmod p(x) [11]. The 
Montgomery factor 2m of GF(p) is replaced by xm in GF(2n), which is exactly equal to 2m in 
a binary representation [7,11,35]. The restriction on m is the same as GF(p), it should not 
be less than the number of bits (n), i.e., m≥n [1]. The elements of GF(p) and GF(2n) are 
represented using similar binary data structure. Element a for both GF(p) and GF(2n) is 
resembled by (an-1 an-2  ... a2 a1 a0) while p=(pn-1 pn-2 ... p2 p1 p0) for GF(p) and              
p=(1 pn-1 pn-2 ... p2 p1 p0), polynomial p(x) for GF(2n) [11]. Our adjusted binary GF(2n) 
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Montgomery inverse (MonInv) procedure consists in a GF(2n) AlmMonInv and a GF(2n) 
CorPh routines as outlined in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
GF(2n) AlmMonInv Algorithm  
Input:   a2m∈GF(2n) & p; (p=irreducible polynomial & m≥n) 
Output: result∈[1, p-1] & k (result=a-12k-mmod p & n<k<2n) 
1.    u = p; v = a2m; r = 0; s = 1; k = 0 
2.    While (v > 0) 
3.          if u0 = 0 then {u = u/2; s = 2s}  
4.          else if v0 = 0 then {v = v/2; r = 2r} 
5.          else if u>v then {u = (u⊕v)/2; r = r⊕s; s = 2s} 
6.          else {v = (u⊕v)/2; s = r⊕s; r = 2r} 
7.          k=k+1 
8.    if r ≥ 2n+1 (||r|| > ||p||) then {result = 2p⊕r} 
9.   else if r ≥ 2n (||r|| = ||p||) then {result = p⊕r} 
10. else result = r  
GF(2n) CorPh Algorithm 
Input:       r, p, m, & cowherd r & k from AlmMonInv 
Output:    result; Where result = a-12m (mod p) 
11.     j = 2m-k 
12.    While j > 0  
13.        r = 2r 
14.        if r ≥ 2n (||r|| = ||p||) then {r = p⊕r} 
15.        j = j-1  
16.    result = r 
 
Figure 6.2 GF(2n) Montgomery inverse algorithm in its binary representation 
 
 
For more clarification of the GF(2n) MonInv computation, see the numerical example 
in Figure 6.3. It takes as inputs the polynomial a(x)=x3+1, represented into Montgomery 
domain as a(x)x9mod p(x) = x4+x2 (m=9≥n=5), and p(x)=x5+x2+1 as the irreducible 
polynomial. All the data are shown in its binary representation (a=1001, a2m=10100, and 
p=100101). The example (Figure 3) follows the convention: 
condition met ! affected registers with their updated values. 
The AlmMonInv routine generates the results a-12k-m=1000, and k=(10)10 (k is a 
normal decimal counter), which are used by the CorPh to provide the Montgomery inverse 
result of 111 (x2+x+1 in the polynomial form). The reader is referred to Appendix B for 
checking the result of this example.  
Observe on Figure 6.2 the several hardware operations applied to compute the 
MonInv in finite field GF(2n). For example, the division and multiplication by two are 
equivalent to one bit shifting the binary representation of polynomials to the right and to 
the left, respectively. Checking the condition of step 5, if u>v, is performed through 
normal (borrow propagate) subtraction and test of the borrow-out bit. The subtraction 
result is completely discarded, only the borrow bit is observed. If the borrow bit is zero, 
then u(x) is greater than v(x). Similarly, the conditions of steps 8, 9, and 14 demands 
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normal subtraction. However, the subtraction this time is used to check ||r(x)||, which 
requires the availability of xn (2n in binary) saved in a register. 
 
 
GF(2n) AlmMonInv Numerical Example 
a = 1001 ∈ GF(25), p=100101, m= 9, n=5 
a2m mod p = 10100 ∈ GF(26) (a in Montgomery domain) 
u = p = 100101, v = a2m = 10100, s = 1, r = k = 0 
v0 = 0 ! v = 1010, r = 0, k=1 
v0 = 0 ! v = 101, r = 0, k=2 
u > v ! u = 10000, r = 1, s = 10, k=3 
u0 = 0 ! u = 1000, s = 100, k=4 
u0 = 0 ! u = 100, s = 1000, k=5 
u0 = 0 ! u = 10, s = 10000, k=6 
u0 = 0 ! u = 1, s = 100000, k=7 
v > u ! v = 10, s = 100001, r = 10, k=8 
v0 = 0 ! v = 1, r = 100, k=9 
u = v ! v = 0, r = 1000, s = 100101, k=10 
||r||<||p|| ! result = r  
GF(2n) CorPh Numerical Example 
p=100101, m= 9, n= 5 
r = 1000 ∈ GF(26), k=10 (from AlmMonInv) 
j = 8 
r = 10000,  j = 7 
r = 100000, ||r|| = ||p|| ! r  = 101,  j = 6 
r = 1010,  j = 5 
r = 10100,  j = 4 
r = 101000, ||r|| = ||p|| ! r  =1101,  j = 3  
r = 11010, j = 2 
r = 110100, ||r|| = ||p|| ! r  =10001,  j = 1 
r = 100010, ||r|| = ||p|| ! r  = 111,  j = 0 
 
∴GF(2n) MonInv of 10100 = 111 (a-12m);   
                                        Where m=9 & n = 5 
 
Figure 6.3 GF(2n) MonInv computation numerical example 
 
 
6.2.3 Multi-Bit Shifting 
 
A further improvement on the GF(2n) MonInv algorithm is performed based on a 
multi-bit shifting method making it similar to the GF(p) algorithm in Figure 6.1. After 
comparing different multi-bit shifting distances applied to reduce the number of iterations 
of the GF(p) MonInv algorithm, the best maximum distance for multi-bit shifting was 
found to be three, as clarified in Section 5.3. The GF(2n) inverse algorithm (Figure 6.2) is 
mapped to hardware involving multi-bit shifting and making it very similar to the GF(p) 
algorithm (Figure 6.1) as shown in Figure 6.4. Note that xn is required in the GF(2n) 
algorithm as an extra variable that is needless in the GF(p) MonInv algorithm; xn (2n) is 
saved in register y in MHW-Alg3 (used in step 9), and in register s in MHW-Alg4 (used in 
step 16.1). These registers (y in MHW-Alg3 and s in MHW-Alg4) are not changed during 
the algorithms execution.  
For both GF(p) and GF(2n) MonInv hardware algorithms (Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.4, 
respectively), the AlmMonInv algorithm needs to finish its computation completely before 
the CorPh begins processing. This data dependency allows the use of the same hardware to 
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execute both algorithms, i.e., both the AlmMonInv and CorPh. The algorithms are 
implemented in the unified and scalable hardware architecture as described in the 
following section. 
 
 
MHW-Alg3:GF(2n) Multi-Bit Shifting AlmMonInv HW 
Algorithm  
Registers: u, v, r, s, x, y, z, & p (all registers hold nmax bits)  
Input:  a2m, 2n∈[1,p-1] (p=irreducible polynomial & m≥n) 
Output:  result∈[1, p-1] & k (result=a-12k-mmod p & n<k<2n) 
1.    u = p; v = a2m; r = 0; s = 1; x = 0; y = 2n; z = 0; k = 0 
2.    if(u2u1u0=000)then{u=ShiftR(u,3);s=ShiftL(s,3);k=k+3};goto 8 
2.1. if(u2u1u0=100)then{u=ShiftR(u,2);s=ShiftL(s,2);k=k+2};goto 8 
2.2. if(u2u1u0=110)then{u=ShiftR(u,1);s=ShiftL(s,1)};goto 7 
3.    if(v2v1v0=000)then{v=ShiftR(v,3);r=ShiftL(r,3);k=k+3};goto 8 
3.1. if(v2v1v0=100)then{v=ShiftR(v,2);r=ShiftL(r,2);k=k+2};goto 8 
3.2. if(v2v1v0=110)then{v=ShiftR(v,1);r=ShiftL(r,1)};goto 8 
4.    S1 = Subtract (u, v); x = v⊕u; z = r⊕s  
5.    if(S1borrow=0)then{u=ShiftR(x,1); r=z; s=ShiftL(s,1)};goto 7 
6.    s = z; v = ShiftR(x,1); r = ShiftL(r,1)  
7.    k = k + 1 
8.    if (v ≠ 0) go to step 2 
9.    x = p⊕r ; z = 2p⊕r ; S1 = Subtract (y,x); S2 = Subtract (y,z) 
10.    if(S1borrow=0)then{result=x} 
10.1  else if(S2borrow=0)then{result=z}  
10.2  else {result = r} 
MHW-Alg4:GF(2n) Multi-Bit Shifting CorPh HW 
Algorithm  
Registers: r, u, v, s, x, y, z, & p (all registers hold nmax bits) 
Input:       r, p, m, 2n & k; 
                        Where r (r=a-12k-mmod p)& k from HW-Alg3 
Output:    result; Where result = a-12m (mod p). 
11.   j = 2m-k-1; x = 0; y = 0; z = 0 
12.  v = 2p; u = 3p; s = 2n  
13.  While j > 0  
14.      if j =1 then {r = ShiftL(r,1); j=j-1}  
15.      else {r = ShiftL(r,2); j=j-2} 
16.      x = p⊕r ; y = u⊕r ; z = u⊕r 
16.1    S1=Subtract(s,x);S2=Subtract(s,y);S3=Subtract(s,z)  
17.      if (S3borrow = 0) then  {r = z}  
18.      else if (S2borrow = 0) then {r = y} 
19.      else if (S1borrow = 0) then  {r = x} 
20.  result = r 
 
Figure 6.4 Montgomery inverse hardware algorithm for GF(2n) 
 
 
6.3 Unified and Scalable Inverter Architecture 
 
Taking into account the amount of effort, time, and money that must be invested in 
designing an inverter, a scalable and unified architecture which can perform arithmetic in 
two commonly used algebraic finite fields, GF(p) and GF(2n) [11,35], is clearly 
advantageous. In this section, we present the hardware design of a Montgomery inverse 
architecture that can be used for both types of fields following the design methodology 
presented in [27]. The proposed unified architecture is obtained from the scalable 
architecture given in [27] but with some modifications, which slightly increased the longest 
path propagation delay and area. The scalable GF(p) Montgomery inverse architecture 
presented in [27] consisted in two main units, a non-scalable memory unit and a scalable 
computing unit. The memory unit is not scalable because it has a limited storage defined 
by the value of nmax. The data values of a and p are first loaded in the memory unit. Then, 
the computing unit read/write (modify) the data using a word size of w bits. The computing 
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unit is completely scalable. It is designed to handle w bits every clock cycle. The 
computing unit does not know the total number of bits, nmax, the memory is holding. It 
computes until the controller indicates that all operands words were processed. Note that 
the actual numbers used may be way smaller than nmax bits. The user needs to identify the 
type of finite field his application needs at the beginning of the computation. An input 
signal FSEL (field select) is dedicated to tell the architecture weather GF(p) or GF(2n) is 
the arithmetic domain for this particular inversion calculation. 
The block diagram for the Montgomery inverter hardware is shown in Figure 6.5. The 
memory unit is connected to the computing unit components. The memory unit is not 
changed from what is presented in [27]. It contains a counter to compute variable k and 
eight first-in-first-out (FIFO) registers used to store the inversion algorithms variables. All 
registers, u, v, r, s, x, y, z and p, are limited to hold at most nmax bits. Each FIFO register has 
its own reset signal generated by the controller. They have counters to keep track of n (the 
number of bits actually used by the application). 
The computing unit is made of four hardware blocks, the add/subtract, shifter, data 
router, and controller block. The GF(p) add/subtract unit and the data router are the only 
components that need to be adjusted to make the inverter hardware unified for GF(p) and 
GF(2n) finite fields. 
The GF(p) add/subtract unit is originally built of two w-bit subtractors, a w-bit 
adder/subtractor, four flip-flops, one multiplexer, a w-bit comparator, and logic gates, as 
detailed in [27]. This unit is adjusted to operate for GF(2n) by adding a set of 3w parallel 
XOR gates used for steps 4 and 9 of MHW-Alg3 and step 16 of MHW-Alg4. The new 
add/subtract unit is shown in Figure 6.6. The signal Control lets the unit perform either two 
subtractions and one addition (step 4 of MHW-Alg), or three subtractions (step 16 of 
MHW-Alg2 and step 16.1 of MHW-Alg4). Three flip-flops are used to hold the 
intermediate borrow-bits of the subtractors and the carry-bit of the adder to implement the 
multi-precision operations. The fourth flip-flop is used to store a flag that keeps track of 
the comparison between u and v, which is used to perform step 8 of MHW-Alg and MHW-
Alg3. The subtractors borrow-out bits are connected to the controller through signals that 
are useful only at the end of each multi-precision addition/subtraction operation. 
Subtractor1 borrow-out bit will affect the flow of the operation to choose either step 5 or 
step 6 of both MHW-Alg and MHW-Alg3. It is also essential in electing the result 
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observed in step 10 of MHW-Alg and of MHW-Alg2. The three subtractors borrow-out 
bits (S1borrow, S2borrow, S3borrow) are likewise necessary for selecting the correct solution of 
the if condition to be one of the steps 17, 18, or 19, from the MHW-Alg2 and from the 
MHW-Alg4 algorithms. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Scalable and unified inverter hardware 
 
 
The shifter is made of two multiplexers and two registers with special mapping of 
some data bits, as shown in Figure 5.5. Depending on the controller signal Distance, the 
shifter acts as a one, two, or three-bit shifter. Two types of shifting operations are needed 
in the MHW-Alg and the MHW-Alg3 algorithms, shifting an operand (u or v) through the 
uv bus one, two, or three bits to the right, and shifting another operand (r or s) through the 
rs bus by a similar number of bits to the left. Shifting u or v is performed through 
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Register1, which is of size w-1 bits. For each word, all the bits of uv are stored in Register1 
except for the least significant bit(s) to be shifted, it is (or they are) read out immediately as 
the most significant bit(s) of the output bus uv_out. Shifting r or s to the left is performed 
via Register2, which is of size w+3 bits similar to shifting uv but to the other direction. 
When executing the MHW-Alg2 or MHW-Alg4, the shifting is performed either to one or 
two bits to the left only, which is via MUX2 and Register2 ignoring MUX1 and Register1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Add/Subtract unit of the scalable and unified hardware 
 
 
The data router capabilities are extended to satisfy the unified architecture 
requirements. It interconnects the memory, add/subtract, and shifter units. The possible 
configurations of the data router are shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7 Data router configurations 
 
 
6.4 Modeling and Analysis 
 
The unified and scalable inverter was modeled and simulated in VHDL. Previously, a 
GF(p) fixed precision and other scalable inverter designs were also implemented in VHDL. 
All developed VHDL implementations of the scalable designs, including the new unified 
ones, have two main parameters, namely nmax and w. The fixed precision hardware, 
however, is parameterized by nmax only. Their area and speed are presented in this section. 
Also a reconfigurable hardware [35] that can perform the inversion in both GF(p) and 
GF(2n) is considered in the comparison. As in the previous Chapters, we didnt define a 
specific architecture for the adders and subtractors to be used in our VHDL 
implementations. Thus, the synthesis tool chooses the best option in terms of area from its 
library of standard cells.  
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6.4.1 Area Comparison 
 
The exact area of any design depends on the technology and minimum feature size. 
For technology independence, we use the equivalent number of NOT-gates as an area 
measure [14]. A CAD tool from Mentor Graphics (Leonardo) was used like Section 3.5. In 
general, Leonardo takes the VHDL design code and provides a synthesized model with its 
area and longest path delay. The target technology is a 0.5µm CMOS defined by the 
AMI0.5 fast library provided in the ASIC Design Kit (ADK) from the same Mentor 
Graphics Company [19]. It has to be mentioned here that the ADK is developed for 
educational purposes and cannot be thoroughly compared to technologies adopted for 
marketable ASICs. It however, provides a framework to contrast all scalable hardware 
designs together and with the fixed precision one. The sizes of the designs are compared in 
Figure 6.8. Observe that the fixed precision design has a better area if the maximum 
number of bits used (nmax) is small which is useless in cryptographic applications [11]. The 
unified designs are larger than the GF(p) ones with a calculated average of 8.4% more 
hardware area.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Area comparison 
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The areas of the unified designs were also compared with the reconfigurable hardware 
[35], but not shown in Figure 6.8. The reconfigurable design core is built of 880,000 
devices [35]. Assume a device is corresponding to a transistor and our NOT-gate is 
equivalent to two transistors [14], so the reconfigurable hardware core is equivalent to 
440,000 gates, which is greater eight times than the largest unified hardware. 
 
 
6.4.2. Speed Comparison 
 
The total computation time is a product of the number of clock cycles the algorithm 
takes and the clock period of the final VLSI implementation. This clock period changes 
with the value of w in the unified and scalable hardware, and changes with the value of nmax 
in the fixed precision hardware. This is because w = nmax in the fixed precision hardware. 
All VHDL coded designs clock cycle periods are generated automatically by Leonardo, 
which determines the longest path delay of the hardware circuits. The clock period of the 
reconfigurable design is set to 20 nanoseconds/cycle (it operates at 50MHz clock 
frequency) [35]. 
The number of clock cycles depends completely on the data and the algorithm. A 
probabilistic study described in Chapter 5 is used to estimate the average number of clock 
cycles. For the fixed precision design, the average number of clock cycles equal to 
Cf = 1.525n. 
For all scalable designs, the function of the average number of clock cycles would be 
Cs=(2.4125n+1)n/w, 
which is exactly the same for the unified designs presented in this paper. Hence, adjusting 
the scalable designs to be unified did not change the number of clock cycles of the inverse 
computation. However, the clock cycle period of the unified designs increased slightly, 
making the total computation time of the unified hardware worse than what was given in 
Chapter 6. The number of clock cycles for the reconfigurable hardware [35] to complete 
the inversion process is reported as 
Cr=14.5n. 
Similar to the GF(p) scalable hardware of Chapter 6, the unified and scalable 
hardware can have several designs for each nmax depending on w. For example, Figure 6.9 
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shows the delay of several designs of the unified and scalable hardware compared to the 
reconfigurable, GF(p) scalable, and fixed precision hardware designs, all modeled for 
nmax=512 bits. Observe how the actual data size (n) plays a big role on the speed of the 
designs. In other words, as n reduces and w is small, the number of clock cycles decrease 
significantly, which considerably reduces the overall computing time of all scalable 
designs (including the unified ones) compared to the fixed precision and reconfigurable 
ones. This is a major advantage of the scalable hardware over the fixed precision [27] and 
reconfigurable ones. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Delay comparison of designs with nmax = 512 bits 
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The new unified designs when compared to the GF(p) scalable ones have very similar 
characteristics. Overall, it computes the inverse in an average of 19.8% more time than the 
GF(p) desings (Chapter 5). Another observation from Figure 6.9 is that the unified designs 
are faster than the fixed precision one as long as: 
 
which is generalized for all different nmax designs after performing several experimental 
tests, namely for nmax= 32, 64, 128, 512 and 1024 bits. Figure 6.9 also shows that the 
unified designs are comparable to the reconfigurable one giving better performance while: 
 
Consider the case when n=nmax=512 bits in Figure 6.9, the unified design with w=64 
bits has almost the same speed as the fixed precision one, but the ones with w=128 bits 
remain faster. In fact, as w gets bigger the total time decreases, which is also true when 
comparing among the different unified designs while n≥w, as also proven before in  
Chapter 5 for the GF(p) scalable designs. Whenever n<w considering the unified and 
scalable designs, the scalability advantage of these designs is reduced since the number of 
words to be processed reached its lower limit, but still the unified and scalable designs are 
faster than the fixed precision one. 
 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This Chapter presents a scalable inverter for both finite fields GF(p) and GF(2n) in a 
unified hardware module that applies the design approach proposed in [27]. The primary 
contribution of this research is to show that it is possible to design a unified hardware 
without compromising scalability and area efficiency. The unified inverter hardware is 
built of two main units, a memory unit and a computing unit. The memory unit defines the 
upper bound of the number of bits that the hardware can handle. The computing unit is the 
real scalable hardware, it is designed to fit in constrained areas and perform the 
computation of numbers in a repetitive way. Our analysis shows that as the word size of 
the scalable computing unit reduces, the hardware area decreases and the possible clock 
frequency increases.  
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The comparisons with other designs show that this unified and scalable structure is 
very attractive for cryptographic systems, particularly for ECC because of its need for 
modular inversion of large numbers in both finite fields GF(p) and GF(2n). The 
experimental work shows that the scalable and unified design can be faster or competitve 
with other alternatives using significantly less area. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
 In this thesis, several contributions to the Montgomery modular inverse computation 
in hardware have been achieved as summarized below: 
• We considered the GF(p) Montgomery inverse algorithms and proposed 
modifications that are applicable for hardware implementations. 
• We proposed new scalable designs to compute the Montgomery inverse, which 
consists in a hardware module that fits on constrained areas and still handle 
operands of any size. In order to have long-precision calculations, the module 
works on small precision words. The word-size, which the module operates, can be 
selected based on the area and performance requirements. The upper limit on the 
operand precision is dictated only by the available memory to store the operands 
and internal results. The scalable module is in principle capable of performing 
infinite-precision Montgomery inverse computation of an integer, modulo a prime 
number.  
• We adopted multi-bit shifting technique to the Montgomery inverse algorithms, 
which reduced the number of iterations significantly and speeded up the entire 
inversion process with small amount of extra hardware. 
• We proposed a fast Montgomery inverse method by introducing a new correction 
phase for a previously proposed almost Montgomery inverse algorithm. This 
approach eliminated the need for a multiplier in the inversion process, using nearly 
the same hardware designed for the almost Montgomery inverse algorithm. 
• We proposed a scalable and unified architecture for a Montgomery inverse 
hardware that operates in both GF(p) and GF(2n) fields. We adjust a GF(2n) 
Montgomery inverse algorithm to accommodate the hardware features and benefit 
from the multi-bit shifting method making it very similar to the proposed best 
design of GF(p) inversion hardware. A comparison of our scalable and unified 
design with a reconfigurable hardware [35] shows that the scalable design saves a 
lot of area and operates in comparable speed. We also compared all scalable 
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designs with fully parallel ones based on the same basic inversion algorithm. All 
scalable designs consumed less area and in general showed better performance 
than the fully parallel ones, which concluded that the scalable design a very 
efficient solution for the long precision numbers Montgomery modular inverse 
computation. 
 
 
7.2 Future Work 
 
Several future research works may be considered as a continuation on this study. 
• The registers of the non-scalable part could be modified to incorporate the bit-
shifting operation. This way, the registers would have the capability to shift all 
their bits at once inside the memory. This feature will reduce the shifting 
operation delay from (n /w +1) clock cycles to one. 
• The longest path of the inversion design is through the adders. Other adders, 
besides carry-look-ahead, could be used in the designs and give a more definite 
picture of its impact on the overall performance.  
• The proposed Montgomery inverse algorithms are performing two main 
operations (shifting and adding). These operations are performed separately in 
different clock cycles. It would be interesting to investigate if the shifting 
operation can be merged with addition and further speedup the inversion process. 
• The non-scalable part (memory unit) is not synthesized, which needs its 
components (registers and counters) to be modeled specifically for each w value. 
In other words, the non-scalable part is built in a parametrizable manner to let it 
be flexible for any w value. This flexibility prevented it from being synthesized. 
This requests that this non-scalable part is to be redesigned in different modules 
structures. Each module is built specifically for every w value such as w= 4, 8, 16, 
32, 64, and 128 bits. Every specific non-scalable module will be connected to the 
scalable part and synthesized together, which is promising to give more realistic 
area and frequency values. 
• The non-scalable part is the limiting part, which will limit the hardware capability. 
If this limit is exceeded even by one bit the non-scalable part is to be replaced. 
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Instead of replacing it, the non-scalable part could be implemented separately on a 
programmable hardware, such as an FPGA, which is reprogrammed whenever any 
change is to take place, while the scalable part remains the same. 
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A THE EXTENDED EUCLIDEAN ALGORITHM 
 
 
When we divide one integer by another (nonzero) integer we get an integer quotient 
(the "answer") plus a remainder (generally a rational number). For instance,  
13/5 = 2 ("the quotient") + 3/5 ("the remainder"). 
We can rephrase this division, totally in terms of integers, without reference to the division 
operation:  
13 = 2 × 5  + 3 
Note that this expression is obtained from the one above it by multiplying both sides of the 
equation by the divisor 5.  
If a and b are positive integers, there exist unique non-negative integers q and r such that : 
a = q × b  + r , where 0 ≤ r < b. 
q is called the quotient and r the remainder.  
The greatest common divisor of integers a and b, denoted by gcd(a,b), is the largest integer 
that divides (remainder = 0) both a and b. So, for example:  
gcd(15, 5) = 5, gcd(7, 9) = 1, gcd(12, 9) = 3, gcd(81, 57) = 3. 
The gcd of two integers can be found by repeated application of the division algorithm, this 
is known as the Euclidean Algorithm [11]. In this algorithm, the divisor is repeatedly 
divided by the remainder until the remainder of this operation is 0. The gcd is the last non-
zero remainder in this algorithm.  
   
The Euclidean Algorithm: 
Inputs: integers a, b. 
Output: gcd(a, b)  
1. while b ≠ 0: 
2. r = a mod b 
3. a = b  
4. b = r 
5. return gcd(a, b) = a 
 
The following example shows the algorithm. Finding gcd(81,57) by the Euclidean 
Algorithm:  
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81 =1 × 57 +24 
57 =2 × 24 +9 
24 =2 × 9 +6 
9 =1 × 6 +3 
6 = 2 × 3 + 0. 
 
It is well known [11] that if the gcd(a, b) = r then there exist integers u and s such that: 
u × a + s × b = r  
By reversing the steps in the Euclidean Algorithm, it is possible to find these integers u and 
s. We shall do this with the above example:  
Starting with the next to last line, we have:  
3 = 9 -  1× 6 
From the line before that, we see that 6 = 24 -  2 × 9, so:  
3 = 9 - 1 × (24 -  2 × 9) = 3 × 9   -  1 × 24 
From the line before that, we have 9 = 57 -  2 × 24, so:  
3 = 3 × (57 -  2 × 24) - 1 × 24 = 3 × 57  -  7 × 24 
And, from the line before that 24 = 81 -  1 × 57, giving us:  
3 = 3 × 57  -  7 × (81 -  1 × 57) = 10 × 57  -  7 × 81 
So we have found u = -7 and s = 10.  
 
The procedure we have followed above is a bit messy because of all the back 
substitutions we have to make. It is possible to reduce the amount of computation involved 
in finding u and s by doing some auxiliary computations as we go forward in the Euclidean 
algorithm (and no back substitutions will be necessary). This is known as the Extended 
Euclidean Algorithm.  
 
The Extended Euclidean Algorithm: 
Inputs:  two non-negative integers a, b with a ≥ b 
Outputs:  d = gcd(a,b) and integers x,y such that ax+by=d 
1.  If b = 0 then set d ← a, x ← 1, y ← 0 and return (d,x,y) 
2.  Set x2 ← 1, x1 ← 0, y2 ← 0, y1 ← 1 
3.  While b > 0 do : 
3.1  q ← a/b , r ← a  qb , x ← x2 - qx1 , y ← y2 - qy1 
3.2  a ← b , b ← r, x2 ← x1 , x1 ← x , y2 ← y1 , y1← y 
4.  Set d ← a , x ← x2 , y ← y2 and return (d,x,y) 
 91
A.1 The Extended Euclidean Algorithm to obtain the inverse of a number mod p 
 
 Suppose we had to find the inverse of a number mod p. This turned out to be a 
difficult task (and not always possible) [11]. A number x has an inverse mod p (i.e., a 
number y so that x.y = 1 mod p) if and only if gcd(x,p) = 1, which implies that there exist 
integers u and s such that 
u.x + s.p = 1. 
But this says that u.x = 1 + (-s)p, or in other words, u.x ≡ 1 (mod p). So, u (reduced 
mod p if need be) is the inverse of x mod p. The Extended Euclidean algorithm will give us 
a method for calculating u efficiently (note that in this application we do not care about the 
value of s, so we will simply ignore it.) 
Lets take a numerical example to find the inverse of 15 mod 26. We will number the 
steps of the extended Euclidean algorithm computation starting with step 0. The quotient 
obtained at step i will be denoted by qi. As we carry out each step of the extended 
Euclidean algorithm, we will also calculate an auxiliary number, ui. For the first two steps, 
the value of this number is given: u0=0 and u1=1. For the remaining steps, we recursively 
calculate ui = ui-2 - ui-1 qi-2 (mod p). Continue this calculation for one step beyond the last 
step of the algorithm to find the inverse. The algorithm starts by "dividing" p by x. If the 
last non-zero remainder occurs at step k, then if this remainder is 1, x has an inverse and it 
is uk+2. (If the remainder is not 1, then x does not have an inverse.) Here are the steps of the 
numerical example to find the inverse of 15 mod 26. 
step 0:  26 = 1 × 15  + 11  u0 = 0 
step 1:  15 = 1 × 11  + 4  u1 = 1 
step 2:  11 = 2 × 4  + 3  u2 = 0 -   1 × 1 mod 26 = 25 
step 3:  4 = 1 × 3  + 1   u3 = 1 -   25× 1 mod 26 = -24 mod 26 = 2 
step 4:  3 = 3 × 1 + 0   u4 = 25 -  2 × 2 mod 26 = 21  
           u5 = 2 -  21× 1  mod 26 = -19 mod 26 = 7 
Notice that 15 × 7 = 105 = 1 + 4 × 26 ≡ 1 (mod 26).  
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A.2 The Binary Euclidean Algorithm 
 
The Euclidean algorithm can be rephrased to a division-free approach by applying the 
following three observations:  
1. If u and v are both even, gcd(u,v) = 2 gcd(u/2, v/2).  
2. If u is even and v is odd, gcd(u,v) = gcd(u/2, v).  
3. Otherwise both are odd, and gcd(u,v) = gcd(|u-v|/2, v). (Euclid's algorithm with a 
division by 2 since the difference of two odd numbers is even).  
 
Here is the algorithm. It is especially efficient for operations on binary representations.  
 
The Binary Euclidean Algorithm 
Inputs:  integers u, v. 
Output:  gcd(u, v) 
1.  g = 1  
2.    while u is even and v is even  
2.1  u = u/2 (right shift)  
2.2  v = v/2  
2.3  g = 2*g (left shift)  
now u or v (or both) are odd  
3.    while u > 0  
3.1  if u is even, u = u/2  
3.2   else if v is even, v = v/2  
3.3   else  
3.4     t = |u-v|/2  
3.5     if u < v, then v = t else u = t  
4.    return gcd(u, v)= g*v  
 
This algorithm was extended as the binary extended Euclidean algorithm as presented 
in [37], which was further studied by Kaliski [3] who proposed the Montgomery inverse 
algorithm. Kaliskis Montgomery inverse algorithm worked as the basic algorithm of our 
research. 
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B GF(2n) NUMERICAL EXAMPLE VERIFICATION 
 
 
This Appendix details the computations and verifies the results used in the GF(2n) 
MonInv numerical example shown in Figure 7.3. The example defines m=9 and n=5; 
where n is the degree of the irreducible polynomial and m (of the Montgomery constant 2m) 
is any number as long as m≥n. To simplify the arithmetic lets only use the binary 
representation of polynomials. The MonInv takes the inputs a=1001 and p=100101. 
However, a is represented into Montgomery domain as a2m, which is calculated as follows: 
a=1001 
a2m=a29=1001000000000 
but since 1001000000000 needs to be reduced by p or a multiple of p until the number of 
significant bits of a29 is less or equal to n (the degree of polynomial a(x)xmmod p(x) should 
be less than the degree of the irreducible polynomial (p(x))), so 
a29⊕ 27p=100100 0000000⊕100101 0000000=10000000 
and 10000000 also needs reduction 
10000000⊕ 22p =10000000⊕ 10010100 = 10100 
So a2mmod p = a29mod p =1001000000000 mod p ≡ 10100 
The GF(2n) MonInv of 10100 = 111 = a-12m, which can be verified similarly:  
The MonInv numerical example (Figure 3) calculated that  
a-129=111! a-1 = 111/29. 
Any congruent polynomial can be XORed with the irreducible polynomial, such as: 
a-129=111≡ 111⊕ 100101 =100010 ! a-128=10001 
a-128=10001≡ 10001⊕ 100101=110100! a-126=1101 
a-126=1101≡ 1101⊕ 100101=101000! a-123=101 
a-123=101≡ 101⊕ 100101=100000! a-1=100 
To confirm this result:  
a . a-1mod p must equal to 1 
a . a-1= 1001 . 100 = 100100 
100100 mod p = 100100⊕ 100101=1 
which confirms that the GF(2n) MonInv of 10100 is 111; where m=9 and n=5. 
